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JPRS-TAC-85-006

29 April 1985

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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29 April 1985

**WORLDWIDE REPORT
ARMS CONTROL**

GENERAL

Congress MX Missile Vote Will Not Help U.S.-USSR Relations (Milika Sundic; Zagreb Domestic Service, 27 Mar 85)	1
Sundic Discusses Soviet-American Relations (Belgrade Domestic Service, 21 Mar 85)	3
Zagreb Views Gorbachev's Talks With Socialist International (Zagreb Domestic Service, 23 Mar 85)	5
Military Policies of Developed Capitalist Countries Discussed (Ferenc Szucs; NEPHADSEREG, 23 Feb 85)	7
VOA Transmitter Poses Strategic Danger to Area (Jasjit Singh; THE TIMES OF INDIA, 6 Mar 85)	11
Gromyko, Sokolov Meet Indian Defense Minister (XINHUA, 2 Apr 85)	13
France Blames NATO Missile Deployment on USSR (XINHUA, 10 Apr 85)	14
Poland's Jaruzelski Urges Halt to Arms Race (XINHUA, 29 Mar 85)	15

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

Reports of Group Meetings 28 March-3 April (TASS, various dates)	16
INF Group 28 March	16
Space Weapons Group 2 April	16
Strategic Arms Group 3 April	16

Karpov Receives Greek Academic Delegation in Geneva (TASS, 27 Mar 85)	17
U.S. Stance Precludes 'Hope for Early Results' at Geneva (PAP, 4 Apr 85)	18
U.S. Using 'Devious, Dangerous Tactics' in Geneva (Prague Domestic Service, 30 Mar 85)	19
RUDE PRAVO Editorial Analyzes the U.S., USSR Attitudes Toward Arms Talks (Prague Domestic Service, 2 Apr 85)	22
American-Soviet 'Rhetoric and Discussion' in Geneva (Gordana Logar; BORBA, 20 Mar 85)	24
Soviet, American Disarmament Negotiators (Mirko Galic; DANAS, 12 Mar 85)	27
Zamyatin Criticizes U.S. Approach to Talks (Leonid Zamyatin; PATRIOT, 18 Mar 85)	30
Soviet UN Envoy Criticizes U.S. 'Cheap Tricks' (XINHUA, 10 Apr 85)	32
RENMIN RIBAO: U.S. Comments on Gorbachev Proposal (Zhang Liang; RENMIN RIBAO, 9 Apr 85)	33
Gromyko, O'Neill Discuss Arms Control Issues (XINHUA, 10 Apr 85)	34
U.S. Official Criticizes USSR on Geneva Talks (XINHUA, 3 Apr 85)	35
Gromyko Informs Clark of USSR Stance at Geneva (XINHUA, 3 Apr 85)	36
Arbatov on USSR Developing MX-Type System (XINHUA, 31 Mar 85)	37
FRG's Genscher Calls for Trust in Arms Talks (XINHUA, 3 Apr 85)	38
Briefs	
Limitation of Arms Race	39

SPACE ARMS

General Staff Chief Supports 'Star Wars' Concept (DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 3 Mar 85)	40
--	----

Rift in Norway's Ruling Coalition Over SDI (Thorleif Andreassen; AFTENPOSTEN, 3 Apr 85)	41
HELSINGIN SANOMAT: Finland Sharpens Opposition to SDI (Editorial; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 29 Mar 85)	43
Finnish Foreign Minister on Use of Outer Space (XINHUA, 28 Mar 85)	44
FRG Prepared To Assist Star Wars Research (XINHUA, 30 Mar 85)	45
XINHUA Cites Labour Party MP's SDI Opposition (XINHUA, 4 Apr 85)	46
LIAOWANG Assesses Reagan's 'Star Wars' Plan (Wu Shijia; LIAOWANG, No 11, 18 Mar 85)	47
U.S. Gets 'Obscure Response' From France on SDI (XINHUA, 30 Mar 85)	52
U.S. Briefs FRG Leaders on Star Wars Program (XINHUA, 28 Mar 85)	54
Europeans 'Apprehensive' About SDI Program (Beijing Domestic Service, 29 Mar 85)	55

SALT/START ISSUES

Pitfalls of Arms Control Negotiations From European View (Francois Puaux; POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Winter 84/85)	57
--	----

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S.- USSR Medium-Range Missile Talks Begin (XINHUA, 29 Mar 85)	66
Belgium Disappointed With Gorbachev Proposal (XINHUA, 9 Apr 85)	67
Anciaux Suggests Postponing Missiles, Reforming NATO (Vic Anciaux; LE SOIR, 2/3 Mar 85)	68

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

USSR Criticizes U.S. Position at Stockholm (XINHUA, 29 Mar 85)	71
---	----

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

- Indian Stand on Nuclear Arms Stated at Geneva
(PATRIOT, 13 Mar 85) 72

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

- CPCZ Daily Claims West Angling for Weapons Increase
(RUDE PRAVO, 8 Mar 85) 73

- CSSR Weekly Comments on Vienna Discussions
(TVORBA, 27 Feb 85) 74

- Comment on Mutual Force Reduction Talks in Vienna
(Dimitrije Seserinac; BORBA, 20 Mar 85) 78

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

- Anniversary of Biological Arms Convention Noted
(Vladimir Solovyev; SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN', 26 Mar 85) 81

- U.S. Accused of Trying to 'Torpedo' CBW Ban
(O. Georgiyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Feb 85) 83

- U.S., Soviet Attitudes on CBW Ban Contrasted
(Vladimir Kuznetsov; MOSCOW NEWS, No 9, 3 Mar 85) 85

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

- Gromyko Urges Spain To Retain Nuclear-Free Status
(Felix Bayon; EL PAIS, 2 Mar 85) 86

NUCLEAR TESTING

- Ratification of Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Deposited
(THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 13 Mar 85) 88

GENERAL

CONGRESS MX MISSILE VOTE WILL NOT HELP U.S.-USSR RELATIONS

LD272303 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Milika Sundic commentary]

[Text] Following the Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives has also voted in favor of producing intercontinental MX missiles. According to numerous assessments this has been Reagan's greatest victory so far at the beginning of his second term of office as president. Milika Sundic comments:

With a majority of only 6 votes the U.S. House of Representatives approved President Reagan's plan to allocate funds amounting to \$1.5 billion for the production of a new batch of 21 MX missiles. These are intercontinental missiles, each carrying 10 warheads.

A few days before the vote in the House of Representatives, the Senate too voted on the same issue, but its decision was no surprise because the Republicans have a majority in the Senate, while the House of Representatives is dominated by the Democrats.

The outcome of the House of Representatives' vote represents a great victory for President Reagan, but it is also a major challenge to world peace at the moment when the two superpowers are holding talks on the reduction and limiting of nuclear missiles and demilitarization of space. Reagan, in fact, succeeded in convincing the congressmen that they should vote for the "peacemaker," and his first reaction was that the outcome of the voting represented an unfailing sign of U.S. strength and resolve and a reliable indication as to how the U.S. delegation would behave at the Geneva talks which opened on 12 March.

At the moment, when the U.S. President is offering a summit meeting to the Soviet Union and when even the mysterious killing of U.S. Major Nicholson in the GDR is used as an argument in favor of a Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, the voting in the U.S. Congress on MX missiles will hardly make a contribution either to an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations or to efforts to speed up the summit meeting, and will contribute least of all to progress at the Geneva talks on the reduction and limiting of nuclear weapons and demilitarization of space.

If one bears in mind the fact that MX missiles rank among the most lethal weapons so far produced in the world, Reagan's assessment that they represent the guardians of peace cannot convince anyone, least of all the second superpower, which is already viewing with suspicion every step made by the U.S. President in the military field.

The fact that Moscow is perhaps not surprised at the outcome of the voting in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives does not mean in the least that the Soviet Union will easily reconcile itself to Reagan's resolve, which in fact is the basic aim of his persistent campaign to persuade the Senate and the House of Representatives to vote in favor of producing a new batch of MX missiles--in other words, to vote exactly the way the U.S. President wanted them to.

Even before the Geneva talks on the reduction and limiting of nuclear weapons and demilitarization of space started, it was known that they would be long and hard. Now that the U.S. Congress has come out in favor of MX missiles it is quite clear that the Geneva negotiators will find it even more difficult to find a common language.

It should not be forgotten that the way Soviet-U.S. relations will develop in the coming period depends to a great extent on the course of the Geneva talks, which are now only beginning. This also includes the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, in which the U.S. President is showing growing interest, unlike Moscow, which continues to refuse to believe that this is his sincere desire.

CSO: 5200/3025

GENERAL

SUNDIC DISCUSSES SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

AU221720 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Mar 85

[Text] This evening's foreign-political commentary is devoted to Soviet-American relations. Do the two superpowers do everything that is necessary to improve mutual relations and how realistic are Washington's expectations that something will change in Soviet foreign policy after Mikhail Gorbachev's election as CPSU Central Committee General Secretary. Here is Milika Sundic:

A possible Soviet-American meeting at the highest level had never been discussed to such an extent as it has been recently, that is, since Konstantin Chernenko died on 10 March.

President Reagan's still unpublished message to the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, handed to Gorbachev by Vice President Bush, as well as several public statements made by leading personalities of the American administration contain an offer of this kind. Also much discussed lately is the forthcoming meeting of George Shultz and Andrey Gromyko in Vienna on 15 May where the question of a Gorbachev-Reagan meeting may be raised along with an exchange of views on the course of the Geneva negotiations on limiting nuclear arms and demilitarization of space. According to some information from Washington, the United States would like the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting to occur during the observance of the 40th UN anniversary in September.

On the Soviet side, however, there are no intimations on the possible Gorbachev-Reagan or Gromyko-Shultz meetings. Moreover, Moscow is still very suspicious about American behavior, and one could say that it does not pay much attention to the intimations by the American side on the need to hold a Soviet-American summit. One could even say that Moscow is very discontented by overall American views on relations with the Soviet Union, especially by the statement Reagan gave a few days ago in Quebec, where he met Canadian Premier Brian [Mulroney]. In contrast to the placatory statements made recently, in Quebec Reagan accused the Soviet Union of violating the Yalta agreements, the Geneva convention banning the use of chemical weapons, the Salt II treaty which limits the deployment of new weapons, and the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty. Larry Speakes, White House press spokesman, commenting on Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at the extraordinary session of the CPSU Central Committee, said on his part that the speech did not differ at all from the standard Soviet course.

Soviet-American relations may be very unfavorably influenced, on the other hand, by the vote just held in the U.S. Senate on the production of 21 MX missiles costing \$1.5 billion. It is significant that 10 Democratic congressmen [as heard] also cast their votes in favor of the production of these missiles. Indeed, this does not yet mean that Reagan's request to Congress has been accepted, for the House of Representatives is still to make a decision on the same project, and it appears that this will be much more difficult because the Democrats have a majority in the House of Representatives.

There are also reports that Moscow is not satisfied with the course of the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons and the demilitarization of space, either. It is asserted that the U.S. delegation is not prepared to discuss the demilitarization of space in the same way as the reduction and limitation of the intercontinental and medium-range missiles, and that the United States in general does not intend to stop space experiments, which is assessed by the Soviet Union as an attempt to undermine the Gromyko-Shultz Geneva agreement, in which the two superpowers actually agreed to begin the disarmament negotiations.

What disturbs Moscow most are the unrealistic American expectations of changes in Soviet policy after the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of CPSU Central Committee general secretary. Such changes were possible only under the condition that the United States changes something for the better in its behavior, but nothing of the kind has been indicated so far.

CSO: 5200/3025

GENERAL

ZAGREB VIEWS GORBACHEV'S TALKS WITH SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

LD232318 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 85

[Text] In his talks with the Socialist International Consultative Council, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke in favor of easing international tension and improving Soviet-U.S. relations. Here is Milika Sundic:

Judging by the statement made by the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz, it is already certain that Gromyko and Shultz, the heads of diplomacy of the two superpowers, will meet in Vienna on 15 March within the framework of the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the state treaty. This information comes as no surprise because the possibility of a Gromyko-Shultz meeting has been discussed for some time, particularly since the day President Reagan sent a personal message to Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, on 13 March.

The meeting of two foreign affairs ministers would be, judging by everything, first and foremost devoted to the Geneva talks on nuclear weapons and demilitarization of space as well to the discussion of the possibility of a Soviet-U.S. summit. President Reagan has already revealed that he has sent such a proposal to Mikhail Gorbachev, along with the remark that this meeting should take place in the United States. In all probability within the framework of marking the 40th anniversary of the UN.

The U.S. President, as he stated himself, has not received a reply to his message. But this does not at all mean that it is not being considered in Moscow. Judging by everything, Moscow is waiting for the first results from the Geneva negotiations because it is assumed that on them alone the Soviet "yes" or "no" to Reagan's offer depends. Parallel with that, the Soviet leadership is following with great attention every move of the U.S. administration, particularly moves regarding the Soviet Union. As matters now stand, the Soviet Union still has not gained the impression that President Reagan is sincerely interested in the two superpowers reaching a comprehensive agreement on disarmament which would be based on the principles of equal security. Moscow sees a confirmation of this also in President Reagan's latest commitment in the sphere of producing intercontinental MX missiles on which the Senate voted a few days ago, as well as in the firm stand on the head of the White House to begin, independent of the course of the Geneva negotiations, space experiments. The Soviet Union is firmly opposed to this.

In less than 2 months, when the Vienna meeting between Gromyko and Shultz should take place, in all likelihood a little more will be known of the way the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear arms and demilitarization of space are proceeding and thus also Moscow's final attitude to Reagan's offer about a meeting between the leaders of the two superpowers. Until then, Moscow will avoid any move which could make agreement with the United States difficult. Because as Mikhail Gorbachev stated in his talks with the Socialist International Consultative Council, good results can be achieved in Geneva if both sides adhere to the spirit and principles adopted at the time agreement was reached to hold the talks. In the course of the talks, Gorbachev advocated that the existing nuclear arsenals should be frozen and the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe suspended, along with abandoning simultaneous countermeasures taken by the Soviet Union.

Although this proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev contains no new elements, the fact is, nevertheless, that it is aimed at relaxing world tension and improving Soviet-U.S. relations. In other words, Moscow has no reason whatsoever to procrastinate with a positive reply to Reagan's offer to meet Mikhail Gorbachev if the U.S. President does a bit more in this direction, primarily, in the direction of a more flexible approach to the Geneva negotiations which began on 12 March. This would be enough for the Soviet leader accepting a meeting with Reagan either in the United States or elsewhere.

CSO: 5200/3025

GENERAL

MILITARY POLICIES OF DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES DISCUSSED

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian 23 Feb 85 p 9

[Excerpts from a speech by Lieutenant General Ferenc Szucs, Assistant Chief of Staff and member of the MSZMP Central Committee, delivered on 6-7 February 1985 in Kaposvar at a national theoretical conference entitled "Capitalism in the 1980's: Crisis and Search for Solutions." One of the organizers of the conference was the MSZMP CC Agit-Prop Section.]

[Excerpts] The past 40 years have been characterized by the political, economic, ideological and military struggle between the two systems, a struggle accompanied by constant attacks from the capitalist world. The most recent counter-attack of the imperialist forces was being planned at the time of the signing of the Helsinki closing document and it unfolded after the signing of the SALT 2 agreement. This can be regarded as a well organized, coordinated imperialist attack which developed in the second half of the 1970's parallel with the new global economic crisis. It represents a very serious economic, political, military and ideological challenge to the socialist world system. The challenge must be taken extraordinarily seriously in every respect, including the military aspect as well, even if this is accompanied by economic trials. Many link the new capitalist counterattack to the name of President Reagan. This is not correct, because what its class interests dictate follows from the nature of imperialism. In any case, even Reagan did not know that he would be nominated president when in 1978 the new armaments program of NATO extending to 1995 was voted on. That portion of this program which was due by 1984 has been implemented ; now they are implementing the part extending to 1995....

I would like to give special emphasis to one interdependency, one linked with the arms race. For example, when Brzezinski talks only of regaining superiority he is, in my opinion, talking about something else. It is a traditional capitalist formula that one must turn to an arms build-up in the interest of getting out of a periodic economic crisis. The profit producing function of weapons manufacture is generally recognized. The average profit in the munitions industry or in weapons production is five to ten times greater than elsewhere. The invested capital is also returned more quickly . So weapons manufacture is one of the vitalizing elements of the militarized

economy of the United States. And the budgetary sums devoted to this purpose are the essential manipulatory tools of the capitalist state for intervention in the economy in the interest of the ruling class and the capitalist system.

During the past 40 years the total military expenditures of the United States were 4,000 billion dollars. They intend to spend another 4,000 billion dollars in the next 10 years, and it is not impossible that this will be 6,000 billion dollars. This serves to characterize the magnitude and the acceleration of what they want to accomplish now in the course of the arms race--4,000 billion in 40 years and another 4,000 billion in 10 years!

It is also important to point out the interdependency that when they started this arms race they wanted to achieve the following goals, among others, with it: to help the capitalist world out of the economic crisis; to pep up the militarized economy of the United States; to replace or modernize about 85 percent of the armaments and supplement them with new weapons systems, thus achieving a superior position and dictating the conditions. Exchanging 85 percent of the armaments in 10 years is such an immeasurably great program as to have substantial influence on every sort of activity of the entire capitalist world system....

I mention as the next interdependency the energy and raw material sources of the capitalist world, the "sphere of vital interests" of the capitalist world.

It is well known that 60 percent of the crude oil production of the world comes from an uncertain environment (this is not our word for it, it is the American one). Only 18.1 percent of it comes from a safe place--14.7 percent from the United States and 3.4 percent from capitalist Europe. All the rest comes from the Soviet Union or from the so-called uncertain--former colonial--environment. Almost 90 percent of the petroleum needs of Europe come from the Near East; the figure is about 70 percent for Japan. Previously Japan imported more oil from the Near East; recently the ratio has somewhat improved because they are buying more from elsewhere and are participating in exploitation of Far East oil. The dependency on oil illustrates rather strikingly what a vital question the Near East oil is for the capitalist world.

The situation is similar--in regard to the dependency of the capitalist world--in the area of strategic raw materials. To an extraordinary extent the United States, West Europe and Japan are dependent on raw materials which can be found in other parts of the world, primarily in developing countries. Of the 24 strategic raw materials important to the economy the United States has to import 12 and most of these it obtains from Africa, primarily from the Republic of South Africa, the "Persian Gulf of minerals"....

Naturally it is not enough to rule these areas, routes to them and delivery possibilities must also be guaranteed. In the West this is formulated by saying that routes of "free maneuver" must be guaranteed throughout the world. Thus they use two methods to acquire global hegemony, to encircle the socialist countries, to ensure and extend rule over the deposits of strategic fuels and raw materials. One: to maintain quickly deployable intervention forces. Two: to station troops at bases outside the home area.

Let us talk first about the quickly deployable forces. The press describes these as a fast army corps and by many other names. Essentially what is involved is an intervention army which can be transported by air or sea, especially equipped and especially trained for those tasks for which it is intended. These tasks require certain bases prepared in advance and warehouses stocked in advance. What is the function of this interventionary army? To ensure by constant military presence the energy and raw material sources in the crisis zones and to hold the developing countries in the interest sphere of the capitalist world. Grenada was the most recent example of how they try to preserve their area of interest....

The results of the science and technology revolution and the development of the tools of production are closely interdependent. Today these have an immediate and direct effect first of all on weapons manufacture and the development of weapons systems. The development of armaments has an effect on the character, course and outcome of a future war, on the tactical principles of strategic operations, in sum on military affairs, but also on the development of the tools of production and, indeed, on the development of society.

The new weapons are not necessarily used. Some of them are sold to the developing world, some are scrapped, and so new billions can be turned to developing more modern weapons....

Here I must say a few words about the tools for space warfare also. Developing tools for space warfare and deploying them in space, the militarization of space, would create a qualitatively new situation in warfare. The question of space armaments must be taken seriously even if some of its elements only belong to the realm of science fiction stories, and if for the time being they only exist in the laboratories and on the desks of scientists. It must be taken seriously because to an increasing extent these scientific fantasies can be realized. It is only a question of time and money. During the past 20 years the United States has spent 50 billion dollars on space research, development and experiments, and the expenditures will increase even more in the future. But it must be taken seriously, for there are already elements which can be used, which might be parts of a future system....

Deployment of the new American anti-missile system would not change the balance of forces, but this balance would be restored at a much higher level.... Creation of the new system is motivated in part by the fact that the United States hopes in this way to restore its territorial invulnerability and in part in order to create for itself the possibility of launching from behind such a missile defense system an unexpected first strike with impunity. The essence of the national strategy of the United States is to replace the previous "mutually assured destruction" with a doctrine of "assured survival" and to get its own people and the peoples of the world to accept it. In this way it wants to mislead them and to prove that a nuclear war can be waged, won and survived, and that it can be limited to Europe as well....

In conclusion let me say a few words about what we can still trust. And permit me to be a bit more subjective here. It is our conviction that war is not

unavoidable. Imperialism can be stronger only in a relative sense, if armaments are increased. However, it cannot be stronger in an absolute sense, in regard to power relationships. So it will not be stronger, only more aggressive. And we have a guarantee against nuclear death, and this is the strength of the Warsaw Pact and the balance of force which we have preserved and will maintain as the most concrete condition for preserving peace. A more concrete condition or guarantee than this we cannot create. This balance and equal security are the guarantees against adventurism. Balance and equal security are interdependent concepts.

So we must continue the hard struggle for peace, although this may appear to some to be only a phrase. We do have allies also on the other side. The first part of the armaments program is about to be completed, it is true, yet implementation of the new plans would increase the danger, because the balance of power will be created on a higher level, because new crises, crisis centers and problems may arise, because international relations may become unstable.

Still, I am an optimist.... I trust in the good sense which exists around the world and I trust that there are also on the other side those who do not want another war.

8984
CSO: 5200/3008

VOA TRANSMITTER POSES STRATEGIC DANGER TO AREA

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 6 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Jasjit Singh]

[Text] THERE have been reports in the press about the possibility of an ELF (extremely low frequency) system being part of the Voice of America (VOA) high-powered transmitting station being established at Chilaw on Sri Lanka's west coast. If true, this has serious implications for strategic balance and super power conflict in the Indian Ocean besides grave environmental hazards of radiation to the population in and around the VOA transmitters.

The U.S. and Sri Lanka had signed an agreement in December 1983 for the establishment of six VOA transmitters with a total capacity of 2,500 KW, making it the largest radio transmitter outside the United States. Unlike the 1951 agreement between the two countries, establishing three transmitters of 35 KW each, the present agreement allows the U.S. to "install associated communication and operation facilities" and the station will be manned by an unspecified number of U.S. personnel for at least seven years. Unlike the previous deal, the present one makes the U.S. responsible for the administration, operation and maintenance of the facilities, implying presumably that Sri Lanka would have no control or access to the facility spread over a 1,000 acres.

Strategic and space warfare are critically dependent on secure and timely communication systems. The U.S. relies heavily on its submarine force for first-strike as well as follow-on strikes in its nuclear strategy. The survival of communications during a nuclear conflict is vital to the command and control of strategic forces, thereby virtually controlling the ability to conduct a nuclear war itself. At the same time secure and rapid

communications with the most vital of U.S. strategic triad — the nuclear armed submarines — is a pre-requisite for the credibility and efficiency of the system.

Important Link

One of the most important links in the complex network of the U.S. communication system, including satellites, relates to the strategic submarine fleet. Because regular radio waves do not penetrate into the oceans, maintaining contact with submarines poses special difficulties. Ordinarily, submarines could raise an antenna to the surface but that reveals their position. Very-Low Frequency (VLF) wave-lengths, however, can penetrate the ocean to a depth of 10-15 metres and allow communications without compromising survivability too much. The U.S. uses a network of VLF stations around the world (believed to include facilities at Diego Garcia, and in Australia amongst others) in the U.S. navy's fleet broadcasting system for submarine communications. Redundancy is provided for by eighteen specially equipped Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft trailing eight km. long VLF antenna in the air. Airborne patrol are, indeed, continuously in flight.

However this elaborate communication system is still cumbersome, susceptible to jamming etc. and poses risks to the security of nuclear-missile submarines, especially because the communication link is completed only when the submarine has an antenna near the surface. On the other hand, technology is making it feasible to detect submarines submerged at shallow depths. The submarines must also significantly reduce speed to less than eight kmph. for effective VLF communication as the

depth increases to even 10 metres or so. The only available frequency for reaching submarines which are travelling at cruising speed and at operational depth is Extremely-Low Frequency (ELF). Although ELF transmits messages at a slow rate, it would be able to reach a submarine at all times. This capability is vital for any first-strike strategy as well as part of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (popularly referred to as Reagan's "Star Wars"). ELF penetrates water hundreds of metres and is virtually unaffected by nuclear blackouts and jamming, thus providing the only sure method of communication with nuclear-missile armed submarines for follow-on strikes.

Significant Hazard

The U.S. navy started researching ELF in 1958; and an ELF test facility has been functional at Clam Lake, Wisconsin, since 1969, with the system hooked to the navy's communication system. To create a proper operational facility, the navy has been proposing a number of projects in Wisconsin which failed to mature due to public apprehensions about the possible harmful physical and environmental effects.

The upper peninsula of Michigan was then chosen as the likely site for the project — code-named "Seafarer" especially because the underlying layers of low-conductivity rock makes that portion of the U.S. particularly suited for ELF transmission by providing geological resonance.

The governor of Michigan tried to veto the installation in 1977; and in 1978 President Carter ordered termination of the project in deference to opposition on environmental grounds.

The U.S. navy is now proceeding with an austere programme in Michigan under a revised name, Project ELF, scheduled to be completed in 1985. This smaller-scale ELF system would cover only the north Atlantic and eastern Pacific Oceans and provide communications at reduced data transmission rate of less than one word in five minutes. Communications with submerged submarines in the western Pacific, and Indian Oceans is not possible with Project ELF. Improving the power and size of the system, even in another location in the U.S., would only improve the data transmission rate, and would not extend the coverage. However, in case of strategic warfare, it is essentially these areas which could prove crucial. A comparable (or a set of less powerful) installation would be required in the Indian Ocean region. Diego Garcia simply does not have adequate land for even a small ELF station and has the additional problem of interference with other communication systems on the densely packed island. Australia would appear to be another option. In fact, as early as 1970, Bob Cooksey, a lecturer in international relations at the Australian National University presented evidence that the so-called "weather station" near Alice Springs in the northern territory was actually an ELF facility.

And now comes the report of plans for possible ELF installation in Sri Lanka! On the face of it, the area of the proposed VOA location would appear to be too small to accommodate anything but a small ELF facility. However, it could cover significant areas of the Indian Ocean and pose a significant environmental hazard to the island.

Critical Role

Secure ELF communications with ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean would constitute a critical link in strategic nuclear conflict in which the U.S. may get engaged. Its importance in relation to time-sensitive targets is even greater; and thus constitutes a pre-requisite for "first-strike" nuclear strategy. The necessity and role of ELF communication coverage of the Indian Ocean have to be understood also in the context of the space warfare strategy of the United States.

The U.S. is developing a conventional warhead equipped with miniature homing vehicle as one of the most promising anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Trial firings

from USAF F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft have already been carried out. The warhead could also be launched on Trident-I or Minuteman submarine-launched missiles to destroy satellites at very high altitudes of 24,000 km. or more. Anti-satellite operations would be time-critical and ELF communications with ASAT missile-armed submarines would be critical to the success of the operation.

The U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative also visualises destruction of Soviet ICBM during the "boost-phase" which means the first five or six minutes after the launch, and before the ICBM has had time to dispense and disperse its multiple nuclear warheads. One of the techniques being developed is that of "pop-up" attack. This, in essence, means launching a light, high-speed interceptor missile which would explore a small nuclear device at nearly 1,000 km. altitude. The nuclear explosion would be employed to focus X-ray laser onto the hostile ICBM which by that time could be around 200-300 km. above the earth still in the boost phase. The dynamics of time and distances for such a highly time-critical interception/destruction would require the interception missile to be launched from a submarine in the north-west Indian Ocean i.e., the Arabian Sea. A small ELP facility in the region could provide the necessary secure, automated and timely communication to the submarines submerged at its operation depth and speed. The system, of course, would be backed by the VLF and other communication systems at Diego Garcia, Masirah (Oman) and the U.S. central command HQ in the region.

If the press reports are true, this brings superpower confrontation and possible nuclear conflict to India's doorstep.

GENERAL

GROMYKO, SOKOLOV MEET INDIAN DEFENSE MINISTER

OW020744 Beijing XINHUA in English 0647 GMT 2 Apr 85

[Excerpts] Moscow, 1 Apr (XINHUA)--Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko received here today visiting Indian Defense Minister P. V. Narashima Rao and exchanged views with him on Soviet-Indian relations and the world situation, reported the Soviet news agency TASS.

Rao stressed that to safeguard and strengthen universal peace is the focus of attention of the Rajiv Gandhi government. He expressed India's hope for progress in the Soviet-U.S. Geneva talks and an end to the dangerous arms race.

Meanwhile, Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would do everything in its power to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to stop the arms race on earth and prevent it in space.

CSO: 5200/4015

GENERAL

FRANCE BLAMES NATO MISSILE DEPLOYMENT ON USSR

OW102159 Beijing XINHUA in English 1646 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] Paris, April 9 (XINHUA) --- A spokesman for the French Ministry for External Relations said today that it is Soviet superiority in the deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe that has led member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy their own missiles.

The spokesman made these remarks while commenting on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe.

He said that the French Government maintains that the Soviet Union has gained an advantage in the deployment of nuclear missiles during the period from 1977 to 1983. This led the NATO countries to seek ways and means of correcting this imbalance first through negotiations. He went on to say that due to the failure of these efforts, the NATO countries moved to reestablish the equilibrium of forces through the deployment of their own missiles.

The spokesman reiterated the "constant position" of the French Government is to seek a durable equilibrium of nuclear forces at the lowest possible level. He continued that the French Government has noted with satisfaction the plan for a summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Recently, the French press has expressed its scepticism about the Soviet gesture. LE MONDE considers Gorbachev's move "an incredible gesture."

CSO: 5200/4023

GENERAL

POLAND'S JARUZELSKI URGES HALT TO ARMS RACE

OW290752 Beijing XINHUA in English 0722 GMT 29 Mar 85

[Text] Warsaw, 28 Mar (XINHUA)--Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski today said that the Soviet Union and the United States should check the arms race during their Geneva talks on disarmament.

The Polish leader, speaking at a party meeting, said the present world has been engulfed by a meaningless arms race. The significance of the Soviet-U.S. talks should be emphasized, he added.

He pointed out, however, that the talks may be long and drawn out.

He expressed his support for the Soviet proposal put forward recently at the talks.

Turning to Soviet-Polish relations, Jaruzelski said his country wants to strengthen its ties to the Soviet Union.

He said the Polish-Soviet treaty and the Warsaw Pact are the cornerstones of his country's foreign policy, and that the Soviet Union is Poland's protector against border encroachments.

CSO: 5200/4015

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

REPORTS OF GROUP MEETINGS 28 MARCH-3 APRIL

INF Group 28 March

LD281247 Moscow TASS in English 1236 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva March 28 TASS--A session of the group on nuclear intermediate-range armaments was held here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Space Weapons Group 2 April

LD021051 Moscow TASS in English 1049 GMT 2 Apr 85

[Text] Geneva, April 2 TASS--The group on space weapons held a sitting here today within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Strategic Arms Group 3 April

LD031141 Moscow TASS in English 1133 GMT 3 Apr 85

[Text] Geneva April 3 TASS--The group for strategic armaments has held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms.

CSO: 5200/1065

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

KARPOV RECEIVES GREEK ACADEMIC DELEGATION IN GENEVA

LD272238 Moscow TASS in English 2152 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, met in Geneva representatives of Greek Universities, who handed him the text of a declaration on disarmament.

During a conversation that followed they stated that they had arrived in Geneva to voice the grave worry of the Greek public over the destinies of peace and to stress that the escalation of the arms race posed a threat to the whole of mankind.

The declaration, signed by the principals of 17 Greek universities, notes, in particular, that the Soviet-U.S. accord on beginning talks to prevent the militarization of space and to put an end to the arms race on earth had been welcomed by all the countries, worried over the increased threat of nuclear catastrophe. However, the document stresses, there is the risk that these talks will become deadlocked and that the hopes for the revival of the climate of detente and disarmament will be dashed, perhaps forever, if the Reagan administration does not give up its plans to militarize space.

In the view of the Greek university principals, the fulfillment of the "star wars" program will lead to the escalation of the arms race and hamper or make impossible altogether arms control and the limitation of armaments in the future. We hope, the declaration says, that this year, in which the 40th anniversary of victory over fascism and 40 years of the United Nations are marked, will become the year of struggle for averting war, ensuring peace and developing cooperation in the world.

The representatives of the Greek universities stated that the text of the declaration would also be handed to the head of the United States delegation.

CSO: 5200/1073

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

U.S. STANCE PRECLUDES 'HOPE FOR EARLY RESULTS' AT GENEVA

LD041231 Warsaw PAP in English 1125 GMT 4 Apr 85

[By unidentified commentator]

[Text] Warsaw, April 3 -- The world public opinion has been monitoring with concern the course of the Geneva negotiations. This concern is justified in a situation when Ronald Reagan's government made the U.S. Congress assign funds for the extension of the American offensive potential which is to be increased by another 21 MX first-strike strategic missiles, and head of the Pentagon Caspar Weinberger demands from 17 U.S. allies in the form of an ultimatum, to participate in the "Star Wars" programme.

This stance by Washington does not permit any hope for early results of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva. These are not easy. Hence, as Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski put it at the PUWP Warsaw Military District Report Conference, it is very important to secure a proper climate around them.

This would be helped by putting a stop, for the period of the negotiations, to those armament processes the continuation of which might after some time lead to a complete change in the initial platform of the negotiations, or in fact to depriving them of essence and sense.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski disclosed that in order to avoid that the Soviet side had recently put forward proposals for mutual steps which would be binding in the course of the negotiations, namely: To declare a moratorium on the development, that is on tests (including scientific-research works), and on the introduction of offensive space weapons, to freeze Soviet and U.S. offensive strategic means at their current quantitative level in terms of the total number of warheads and their carriers, and to halt the deployment in Europe of the American medium-range nuclear missiles with a simultaneous stop to the Soviet corresponding countermeasures.

The attitude to this clear and honest proposal will be an important indicator of real intentions and credibility of the U.S. declarations.

CSO: 5200/26

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

U.S. USING 'DEVIOUS, DANGEROUS TACTICS' IN GENEVA

LD310903 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1615 GMT 30 Mar 85

[Text] Our regular weekly foreign political commentary, written and presented today by Antonin Kostka, deals with the American stance at the Geneva talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on space weapons, strategic weapons, and medium-range nuclear missiles.

[Kostka] The talks in Geneva have been going on this week under unusual and particularly strange circumstances which raise serious doubts about the United States' interest in reaching an agreement, and which expose the highly devious and dangerous tactics chosen by the Reagan administration for these talks.

First, certain facts have cast a direct shadow on the talks. Prior to the vote on the new MX nuclear missile system in the House of Representatives, President Reagan summoned for assistance from Geneva, Max Kampelman, head of the delegation, and John Tower, head of the group for strategic weapons. Both of them unanimously urged the congressmen that the new missiles are essential if the Russians are to be forced into agreement at Geneva. The fact that the main American negotiators on disarmament popped back home in the role of chief advocates of a further arms build-up not only destroyed their credibility, but also called into question the whole intention of the American delegation at Geneva.

Another very unfavorable influence on the course of the talks is the fact that U.S. government circles, in contravention of the agreement on the confidentiality of the talks, have been spreading false reports on their progress, for example, according to them, the talks are currently in the process of negotiating what they call the scope or some kind of calling on space weapons, in accordance with the views held by President Reagan and other officials.

Consequently, the Soviet delegation was obliged to deny these fabrications masquerading as accidental leaks, and set the record straight; namely that there can be no question whatsoever of any negotiations on any matter of this kind, because the sole aim of the talks, according to the original Soviet-American agreement in January, is measures which would do quite the opposite; that is, which would prevent the build-up of arms in space in any way, shape, or form.

Another directly negative effect on the course of the Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear weapons was the speech given by the American representative at the conference on disarmament which is going on at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Donald (Lowitz), because his speech was based on the thesis that space weapons are, in fact, the only way to disarmament, because they will mean a restructuring of the basis of the current strategic stability.

The real U.S. attitude to the Geneva disarmament talks is revealed perhaps even more starkly, and the prospects for the talks are jeopardized even more tangibly, by the behavior of the United States outside the Geneva negotiating forum. Here I am referring to, in particular, the approval of more funds for the development of the MX strategic nuclear missile system. This, in effect, gives the lie to two main lines of American propaganda calculated to conceal U.S. war preparations; firstly that one of the aims of the American government at the Geneva talks is, so they say, to reduce the level of strategic weapons; and secondly, the argument which falsely portrays space weapons as representing a shift in U.S. thinking to a strategy of reliable defense. The upgrading of their first-strike capability, of which the MX system is a part, shows that space weapons are intended only to increase the overall strike force of the American Armed Forces and make it possible to carry out a first strike relative unpunished.

However the most telling and most dangerous attack on the Geneva talks was assigned by Reagan to his minister for military matters, Weinberger. On the occasion of the NATO nuclear planning group's session, he had the task of persuading all the NATO countries to the idea of cooperating in the space weapons projects, including France, which so far has not taken a full part in NATO's military activities, and also Japan, Australia, and Israel. While Greece and Australia gave a clear thumbs-down to cooperation of this kind, the most highly industrialized states, especially Japan and the FRG, have already begun singling out those sectors of industry which will take on appropriate orders.

In addition, a number of teams of American experts are currently beavering away in various NATO countries at the task of winning over hesitant ministers of different governments and at setting out specific forms of future cooperation in space weapons. By actions of this kind, the United States is making it abundantly clear not only that it intends to push ahead stubbornly with its intentions to militarize space and thus with its dangerous illusion that it is just these space weapons which will now guarantee it substantial superiority, but also that it is trying to spread the implementation of its plans over the widest possible international footing, both geographically and financially.

Under these circumstances the logical question arises: Why is the United States at the Geneva talks at all? Or to be more precise, what sense is there in its playing at talks? Well, first of all we must realize that the United States could not really refuse to take part in the talks, not only because President Reagan needed to boost his international reputation in his recent election campaign, but also because of the strong pressure from public opinion round the world--at the UN, and within NATO itself. In any case, it is not

the first time that the United States has had to give a semblance of adapting its policies to the prevailing winds. This time too, it seems, as far as the new Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear weapons are concerned, the United States has no intention of carrying through this adaptation of its policies to its conclusion. To coin a well-known saying: a leopard cannot change its spots.

And so at Geneva too, as so often in the past, the United States is stepping up its military preparations even more intensively.

In this respect it is worth pointing out that, for example, during the talks on the first agreement on limiting nuclear weapons, the United States increased the number of nuclear warheads in its arsenals by 2,360, and during the talks on the second agreement on strategic weapons by as many as 3,700. Now, by authorizing the production of 21 MX missiles, each of which carries 10 nuclear warheads, the Rapid Deployment Strike Force of the American Armed Forces is to grow by 210 nuclear units, and this is only the 3d week of the Geneva talks! Moreover, there are to be more than 200 of these missiles, or more than 2,000 additional nuclear warheads.

The Soviet Union's approach, as expressed by the highest Soviet representative Mikhail Gorbachev during his recent meetings with senior officials of the Socialist International, is clear and principled: The Soviet Union will not allow the public to be duped; it will not allow preparations for war to continue behind the smokescreen of the disarmament talks. Full responsibility for any eventual failure of the Geneva talks, of course, and thus any consequent further build-up of the arms race, will fall totally on the United States and on the administration of President Reagan.

CSO: 5500/3031

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL ANALYZES THE U.S., USSR ATTITUDES TOWARD ARMS TALKS

LD020914 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0700 GMT 2 Apr 85

[Text] The RUDE PRAVO editorial entitled "Different Stance--Different Aim" analyzes U.S. and Soviet attitudes toward the current Geneva talks. The paper stresses that what the American administration is now doing to intensify preparations for the militarization of space is very alarming. It recalls that the Geneva talks on the complex of questions concerning both nuclear and space weapons constitute a new and realistic opportunity to achieve such agreements, which would mean embarking on the road toward curbing and halting the feverish arms buildup.

The key and most urgent issue is a comprehensive discussion of the question of space and nuclear weapons, for it is essential to adopt speedy measures preventing the new round of the arms race. RUDE PRAVO points out that President Reagan's administration is now attempting to circumvent the central element of the 8 January negotiations, which stipulated that discussions on the questions of nuclear and space weapons would be linked to each other. It would like to use the Geneva talks to cover up the further escalation of its feverish arms buildup.

The paper recalls that the United States resorted to such maneuvers to deceive the public at the previous Soviet-American talks in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons systems when it used various delays and dodges to make preparations for the deployment of these weapons in West European countries. The paper also recalls Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals made during his meeting with officials of Socialist International in Moscow on freezing the two sides' nuclear arsenals and also halting the missile deployment. The fact is that the Soviet Union is convinced that if the deployment of new American missiles in Europe and also the expansion of Soviet retaliatory measures are halted, this would make a significant contribution to the solution of the whole complex of issues under discussion in Geneva.

The United States has reacted to this unequivocal position of the Soviet Union truly in its own peculiar manner. President Reagan has recently pushed through the U.S. congress the allocation of more dollars for the manufacture of the first-strike strategic MX missiles. Now the United States is also trying to involve in the new round of the arms buildup its allies in NATO as well as Japan, France, Israel and Australia, and is requesting them to share in the militarization of space both financially and technologically.

RUDE PRAVO stresses that in Geneva the Soviet Union is being guided consistently, as always in the past, by the agreed principles and agreements, while at the same time not losing sight of the subject and aim of the talks, that is the aversion of the threat of nuclear war. The paper continues by summing up the measures which the Soviet delegation has proposed in Geneva to the American side in the interest of the success of the talks. These measures show not only the unshakable and sincere endeavor of the Soviet Union to reach constructive results in Geneva but also that along the road to halting the feverish arms buildup it is possible to make realistic and constructive steps while maintaining the principle of equality and equal security for both sides.

In conclusion RUDE PRAVO stresses that both the past years and the urgency of the current situation show that the Soviet Union, in contrast to the United States, has never avoided constructive talks and honest dialogue nor has it avoided any realistic steps to curb the feverish arms buildup. For a very long time now it has been the turn of the U.S. administration.

CSO: 5500/3031

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

AMERICAN-SOVIET 'RHETORIC AND DISCUSSION' IN GENEVA

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Gordana Logar, BORBA correspondent in New York: "Reagan Speaks in Harsher Tones"]

[Text] New York, 19 Mar--At the end of his 2-day visit to Canada, where he found in Premier Brian Mulroney much more understanding and support than with his predecessor Trudeau, President Reagan spoke in harsher tones toward the Soviet Union in the speech he gave at lunch.

After expressing the hope that the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev "would open up new opportunities for improvement of relations between East and West," the American president sharply criticized the Soviet policy conducted up to now and the "painful reality" in which signed international treaties and human rights are being violated, religion is being prohibited, and democracy is being destroyed.

"They signed an agreement at Yalta which called for free elections in eastern Europe, but they got around them and established their own domination. They signed the Geneva Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "SALT-2" which restricts development of new weapons and a third, the ABM, on the anti-ballistic missile system, but they are not honoring any of them. The same applies to the Helsinki document on individual and other liberties. We still want to demonstrate our hope that new opportunities for constructive relations between us will come out of last week's changes in Moscow, Reagan said.

Contrary to the Letter

This is in some contrast to the mild tone in which, it is said, the letter was written to Mikhail Gorbachev. President Reagan is a man who personally believes in his idea of the Soviet Union and he does not change it even when he really wants better relations. He is now at odds with Congress--the debate begins today in the Senate--to win passage of production this year of 20 new MX missiles (21 have already been produced), and another 48 next year out of the total of 100, which is the number envisaged by the plan for modernization of American defense, which would be prepared to respond to an enemy's first strike. The vote is expected to be close.

Reagan is ensuring the Congress not only that the Soviets are ahead of America in this type of missiles, but also that support for the new production of the "peacekeeper," as this type of missile is called, would demonstrate that the two U.S. parties are united in the policy of a strong defense. Above all President Reagan asserts that the MX missiles could be a "bargaining chip" in Geneva. As he sees it, only if America has these weapons will the Soviets be willing to reduce the number of their own missiles. If this does not happen, the Geneva negotiations on reduction of nuclear weapons would be only a formality for propaganda purposes. Given that approach and the uncertain outcome of the vote, Reagan telephoned senators from Canada to assure them that they should accept his proposal--it is not a bad idea to talk harshly once again about Soviet policy and the danger which threatens.

Reagan's sharper tone can also be related to the fact that Gorbachev has not yet responded to his invitation for a meeting. It has been learned today that Shultz and Gromyko will meet in Vienna in May and that they will probably talk about a summit meeting between the two. Worse than that is perhaps the echo of the recent disagreements which have been occurring off the stage at Geneva, but directly related to the negotiations. The interview given to Soviet television by Karpov, the head of the Soviet negotiating team in Geneva, in which he said that the United States is violating an earlier agreement and does not want to talk directly about halting the space race (Reagan's project for defensive weapons popularly called "Star Wars"), met with criticism on the part of George Shultz. Immediately thereafter TASS and PRAVDA spoke in the same way about the American attitude which evoked a reaction accompanied by the remark that it seemed that the Soviets were looking upon the dialogue in Geneva as a propaganda gesture.

A Bad Sign

The accusations coming from both sides, when the talks have not really even gotten started, are a rather unusual sign, but they are not a bad sign about how they are going and especially about the outcome, although it would be too early to conclude where the renewal of the harsh tone is leading.

It is interesting that the military topic was also an occasion for controversies in Canada. Although the visit ended with the signing of not only economic agreements and one about environmental protection, but also one about modernization of the radar line on the border between the two countries, in an interview over Canadian television Caspar Weinberger, the American secretary of defense, left open the possibility that America would want to set up "Cruise" missiles on Canadian territory. This led to denials even from the White House and from the office of Premier Mulroney, but it encouraged his opposition and the peace movement in Canada.

The radar system has existed between the two countries for 34 years now and is used for early detection of hostile aircraft. Since it has become outdated, it will now be replaced under the agreement. The question has therefore been raised in the Canadian public of whether this system will not later be integrated into the American "Star Wars" project, which was resolutely denied by both Reagan and Mulroney. One reason the denials were so emphatic is that THE

NEW YORK TIMES reported recently that the United States has a plan to set up nuclear weapons at Canadian bases in an exceptional situation.

This article aroused great excitement in the Pentagon and State Department, and the author of the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES was even barred from continuing to report the news from the State Department. After public pressure this prohibition was removed, but both here and obviously in Canada there remains a suspicion that American weapons might also spread over the entire continent. It is not out of the question, then, that in Quebec Reagan accused Moscow of the same thing, saying that it has spread out "from Afghanistan and Cambodia across Angola and Ethiopia to Nicaragua."

Things obviously do not change easily, and the warmer winds are especially slow in coming in the Cold War, which has gone on for a long time.

7045
CSO: 5200/3009

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET, AMERICAN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATORS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 85 p 32

[Article by Mirko Galic: "Negotiators on Lead Strings"]

[Text] In important negotiations between states the figures of the principal negotiators have the privilege--or misfortune--to be remembered even when the talks fail, when they run completely aground on the impermissible "tactics" of the two sides. They, the negotiators, are immortal, even when the negotiations are something that comes and goes. Following the many who have entered history in this way, sometimes happily, sometimes tragically, Max Kampelman and Viktor Karpov have just now qualified for this kind of immortality. It is not known, it is difficult at present to say, whether the world will remember them for good or for ill; this depends on whether in the new American-Soviet negotiating dance they can do something more than giving a sterile hope that the great powers have become aware that the Damocles sword of nuclear weapons is hanging ever more dangerously over the neck of our world and our civilization.

Neither the American nor the Russian (the Soviet representative particularly) is an unknown "face" in the select society of great negotiators. Viktor Karpov does not have the fame of his chess-playing namesake, although on more than one occasion he has been involved in a similar marathon duel, even with the same destiny, that is, an interruption, not because of the exhaustion of the negotiators, but because of the "new circumstances" (the installation of the Pershings in Europe) in relations between the two superpowers. Diplomacy usually operates in the shadow or from behind the shadow, but Karpov the diplomat has not been in the shadow of his post: at the age of 56 he enjoys the reputation of the leading Soviet "ambassador on special mission" (in America they are called "traveling ambassadors"). They say that he is the youngest to have played that role and has the most experience (since 1968). In its selection Moscow was obviously guided by the criteria of a high level of professionalism and its own needs; in Geneva it needs a superb technician (not an ideologue) to carry out what is being directed from the Soviet capital (where the ideologues make the decisions).

Nor is Kampelman anything other than a "negotiator on lead strings" that go back to President Reagan, with whom he enjoys a high reputation, although he comes from rival ranks (democrats). The American does not have the diplomatic

past of his Soviet colleague, he is not a career diplomat; but he is not altogether without a diplomatic career. President Carter in his time appointed him to the delegation for the Madrid Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, and his successor in the White House did not withdraw him. The relationship between Reagan and Kampelman is a strange one, it is rather difficult to determine where loyalty ends and treason begins. The principal American negotiator in Geneva last year was on Walter Mondale's foreign policy staff, and he is very close to Carter's influential advisor Brzezinski. He has come to Geneva as "Reagan's man" (and one who is trusted).

Yet why did Ronald Reagan decide to send an inexperienced diplomat and an experienced lawyer to head the American delegation in "lengthy and complicated negotiations" with the Soviets? Because of his speaking abilities and, it is said, high intelligence? Or because of Kampelman's views? If the American president truly wants to confront the Soviets with the temptation of his "Star Wars" then he has sent a negotiator who will fervently represent him: Kampelman recently published an article along with Brzezinski and a well-known physicist in the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE in favor of the space defense initiative. He even calculated that if it was 90 percent efficient this system could destroy enemy missiles, either after launching or before activation.

They say of Max Kampelman that he is a pleasant man in private; certainly he will be someone awkward for the Soviets to talk to. They have already found this out on one occasion, in Madrid, when he took every opportunity to attack the "Soviet bloc" for violating human rights. In Geneva Karpov will avoid a direct one on one with him, since the leader of the Soviet delegation leads the strategic weapons group (intercontinental missiles, submarines and airplanes), and the leader of the American delegation the space weapons group (the negotiations will be conducted in yet another group: the Euromissiles). Karpov will not have an easier opposite number in the person of the conservative senator from Texas, John Tower, yet another nondiplomat on that diplomatic team.

But in the "Star Wars" Kampelman will be facing on the other side of the table the distinguished Soviet diplomat Kvitsinskiy, the same negotiator who in the well-known "walk in the Geneva woods" with Paul Nitze 30 months ago sought in vain a modus vivendi with the problem of Euromissiles. The present space walk will certainly be more uncertain and difficult for both Kvitsinskiy and Kampelman. After all, however, enthusiastic Reagan is over the long shot of space defense, the Soviets are just as determined to make renunciation of "Star Wars" a condition without which there will be no progress whatsoever in negotiations on limitation and control of nuclear arms.

As the Soviets see it, "altogether new negotiations" are being conducted in Geneva; their delegation is the old one, since both Viktor Karpov and Yuriy Kvitsinskiy were already in the "old Geneva," the first for strategic weapons (START) the latter for medium-range weapons (FNI). The Americans gave in to the Soviet version of "new negotiations" and designated their new negotiators according to the needs of American policy. The "superb technician" Karpov will be faced by the "passionate ideologue" Kampelman ("conservative democrat"), and the Soviet diplomatic trio (the third person is Aleksey Obukov)

will be opposed by an American lawyer, a senator and a diplomat (Maynard Glitsman). And on both sides well-known policies, with differences which do not afford very much right to great hopes unless there is more realism and less one-sidedness in the approach of the superpowers.

That depends on whether the negotiators once again overshadow the negotiations.

7045
CSO: 5200/3009

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

ZAMYATIN CRITICIZES U.S. APPROACH TO TALKS

BK270758 Delhi PATRIOT in English 18 Mar 85 p 4

[Replies by Leonid Zamyatin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and head of its International Information Department, to questions put to him by PATRIOT's Moscow Correspondent P. Roychoudhury and PTI and UNI]

[Excerpt]

Question: New Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva opened at the time of the second anniversary of the 7th Nonaligned Conference. Are you optimistic about their positive outcome? If they fail, don't you think this will worsen the international political climate further? How would you comment on this?

Answer: The heightened interest in the Geneva talks is easy to explain. Their results will decide whether the world will pursue the arms race more rapidly and the danger of war increases, or reason will prevail.

The Soviet Union does not seek any unilateral advantages or military superiority over the United States and NATO countries.

We uphold the principle of equality and equal security. We want the arms race to end, not to continue; we want real cuts in armaments, not the development of ever-new weapon systems, be it in space or on earth, whether offensive or defensive. Our aim is to abolish all nuclear weapons everywhere in the world, to eliminate the threat of nuclear war altogether.

Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the United States, which will largely determine the course of negotiations in Geneva. The fact is that on the eve of the meeting it was the American mass information media that circulated bleak forecasts all over the world.

U.S. officials say that they will continue to carry on their plans to militarise space. For the sake of camouflage, they declare that it is only research work. But what sort of work, one may wonder? The answer is one to develop allegedly defensive weapons, whether nuclear, laser-based, or other, for deployment in space. If we take off the veil, it will become obvious that this means a new spiral in the arms race.

It should be made clear that the Soviet Union will never agree to the superiority of the U.S. for success in this field it is absolutely necessary to examine and decide matters related to space and nuclear armaments as one complex in their interconnection.

Judging from your question, the Indian public, as well as the Soviet, American and other peoples, are anxious to know what happens if the negotiations in Geneva end in failure.

I can only confirm once again that the Soviet Union takes a very sober view of such a prospect and is doing whatever it can to prevent it from becoming a reality. The Soviet leadership does not share the forecasts dooming the talks to a fiasco. The Soviet Union will work for tangible and practical results.

CSO: 5200/1072

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET UN ENVOY CRITICIZES U.S. 'CHEAP TRICKS'

OW100330 Beijing XINHUA in English 0317 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] United Nations, April 9 (XINHUA) -- The Soviet Union criticized the United States here today for playing "cheap tricks" in the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva. Ambassador Richard Ovinnikov, first deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, explained cheap tricks meant "to negotiate only on one or two aspects out of the three and 'the star wars' is still kept under the table of the negotiations".

At a press conference here, Ambassador Ovinnikov told reporters that the Soviet Union stands for an "honest dialogue". By an "honest dialogue", he continued, the Soviet Union "means for example that there should be no misuse of those negotiations for smoke-screen purposes or specially for bettering new arms programmes".

The ambassador continued: "Both participants should put all their cards on the table. They shouldn't cheat each other". He accused the United States of "keeping some of their cards, rather some of their weapons, weapon systems or weapon programs, under the table of the negotiations."

Ovinnikov said that the Soviet Union only wanted to terminate the deployment of the medium-range weapons in Europe, but also to achieve a "moratorium on all star war systems and moratorium on all offensive strategic weapons". The "star war system", which is also called "strategic defense initiative", Ovinnikov noted, could in actual practice "be used for the first strike itself". He called for an agreement with the United States on all three aspects of the negotiations in Geneva -- on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, on a substantial reduction of the offensive strategic weapons and on medium-range missiles in Europe.

Asked about a possible Soviet-American summit meeting, Ovinnikov said "we do not put forward any preconditions for a summit meeting. Actually we think, we hope a summit meeting could give a very well needed political impetus to the development of our bilateral relations, to the development of the normal situation in the world."

Asked about whether Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev would use the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations this October to meet U.S. President Ronald Reagan in New York, Ovinnikov replied: "We have not come to that stage yet." In any case, he added, "there is no direct connection between the 40th anniversary of the United Nations and the possible meeting".

CSO: 5200/4023

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

RENMIN RIBAO: U.S. COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

HK100311 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 9 Apr 85 p 1

["Special dispatch" from Washington by reporter Zhang Liang: "U.S. Comments on Soviet Decision To Freeze Deployment of Medium-Range Missiles in Europe"]

[Text] Yesterday the U.S. Government made a swift and "prudent" response to the talk by Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the announcement of the Soviet Union's unilaterally freezing the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, saying this decision was made in an attempt to maintain their nuclear advantage in Europe.

On the morning of the 7th, McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, circulated a notice to President Reagan, vacationing in California, on the Soviet Union's decision. Later, McFarlane told reporters that President Reagan has expressed "disappointment" with Gorbachev's proposal.

In a brief statement, White House spokesman Speakes said that the United States will "study" the talk by General Secretary Gorbachev and give it "proper" consideration. But the statement also said that this proposal to temporarily stop the deployment of nuclear missiles was aimed at freezing their existing great advantage, because as far as the number of missiles deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe is concerned, the Soviet Union already enjoys a 10:1 advantage. The statement said that the United States holds that the most urgent need at present is to greatly reduce the offensive nuclear missiles for the United States and the Soviet Union.

CSO: 5200/4024

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

GROMYKO, O'NEILL DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

OW100218 Beijing XINHUA in English 0148 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] Moscow, April 9 (XINHUA) -- The Soviet Union hopes to make substantial and concrete progress in Soviet-U.S. relations through the Geneva arms control talks and other means, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko said today.

Meeting with a 13-member U.S. Congressional delegation headed by U.S. House Speaker Thomas O'Neill, Gromyko pointed out that Soviet-U.S. relations are an important factor in international politics.

He analyzed the causes of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and said the arms race in outer space is especially intolerable. He also emphasized the importance of checking the arms race on earth.

The Geneva talks provide the possibilities to reach agreements on such issues, Gromyko said, adding it is now up to the United States to realize these possibilities.

The congressmen reaffirmed the U.S. position on these issues, and said that the United States considers its "star wars" plan a defensive space weapons system.

They said they seek a normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations, and hoped the Geneva talks now in process will realize this goal.

The U.S. congressional delegation arrived here for an official visit on April 7.

CSO: 5200/4023

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

U.S. OFFICIAL CRITICIZES USSR ON GENEVA TALKS

OW031113 Beijing XINHUA in English 0749 GMT 3 Apr 85

[*"U.S. Official Blames Soviet Union for Sticking to 'Star Wars' in Geneva Talks"*--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, 2 Apr (XINHUA)--As long as Moscow continues to focus on the U.S. "star wars" program, the Geneva arms control talks will not go anywhere, and the Soviet Union will have to "bear the onus of world public opinion," Edward L. Rowny, special adviser to the U.S. President on arms Control matters, said today.

Rowny said that the Soviet Union is avoiding discussing curbs on offensive nuclear arms which, he said, is the main object of the U.S.-Soviet talks that opened 12 March. "If there is to be progress toward reducing nuclear arms, Moscow's attitudes must change," Rowny said today at a St. Louis meeting.

"Reducing the threat of nuclear war now by an agreement on reducing today's offensive arms is far more important than discussing what might happen a decade or two from now if strategic defenses prove feasible."

He pointed out that Moscow is also engaged in research programs of defensive systems. "What the Soviets seem bent on doing is continuing their own research while trying to stop ours," he said.

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger made similar remarks today while releasing the Pentagon's fourth annual report on Soviet military power. The Soviet Union is protesting President Reagan's "star wars" initiative only because it has launched a massive, similar effort of its own and wants to preserve a monopoly in the area of high-tech warfare, he said.

At the White House, Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes played down Rowny's remarks on the Geneva talks, saying, "I don't think it's a negative assessment as much as it is an observation about the future." He said what Rowny meant was that if the Soviets persist in dwelling on (star wars) research, "It could slow things down a bit." "It is much too early to try to give you an assessment...of the progress of the talks," Speakes added.

CSO: 5200/4015

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

GROMYKO INFORMS CLARK OF USSR STANCE AT GENEVA

OW031957 Beijing XINHUA in English 1629 GMT 3 Apr 85

[Excerpt] Moscow, 3 Apr (XINHUA)--Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko today reiterated that only when the United States takes steps corresponding to what the Soviet Union has taken, could the Geneva talks hope to attain its goal.

Conferring with the visiting Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Charles Clark, who came to the Soviet Union on 30 March, Gromyko said that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was, first and foremost, aimed at effecting a decisive and positive turn in the international situation. The Soviet Union would continue to strive for disarmament and peace. This was the stand that had prompted the Soviet Union to meet the United States in Geneva, he said, according to a TASS report.

Clark told him that the Canadian Government placed great hope on the Geneva talks and would do what it could to make the talks a success.

CSO: 5200/4015

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

ARBATOV ON USSR DEVELOPING MX-TYPE SYSTEM

OW310752 Beijing XINHUA in English 0734 GMT 31 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow, 30 Mar (XINHUA)--The Soviet Union will not "make concessions to Americans in the Geneva talks," and will be compelled to develop and deploy a counterpart to the MX missile in order to preserve the balance, Georgiy Arbatov, director of the U.S.-Canada Institute, said here today.

Speaking on television, Arbatov said, "What is most disconcerting is the obscurity and uncertainty about the U.S. Government's intentions."

He said as the talks in Geneva are complicated and likely to last long, the Soviet Union proposed a freeze on the Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons at the present level and a halt to the tests and deployment of space weapons during the talks, for if the arms race continues, new weapon systems will make the negotiations more difficult.

He added that the U.S., though possessing the most powerful economic force in the capitalist world, will suffer serious consequences in the long run as its economic potentialities have their limits. The arms race has already driven the U.S. into enormous national debts and budget deficits. It has also burdened the Soviet Union, which has to spend more on arms, though unwillingly, he said.

The U.S. Congress recently approved a bill of 1.5 billion dollars to build an additional 21 MX missiles.

CSO: 5200/4015

29 April 1985

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER CALLS FOR TRUST IN ARMS TALKS

OW031143 Beijing XINHUA in English 0901 GMT 3 Apr 85

[Text] Geneva, 2 Apr (XINHUA)--Federal German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today called for mutual trust between the United States and the Soviet Union in their arms talks. He also called for a new phase of detente between East and West.

Speaking at the disarmament talks held here today, the German minister said his government "fully agrees" to the aims set for the U.S.-Soviet talks.

But he said the arms talks should not be held in "an atmosphere of mutual distrust, defamation and indifference."

He said it is possible to have verification of disarmament. "Those who rule out the possibility of verification leave the impression that they have something to hide," he added.

Genscher stressed the Germans have a feeling that European security is threatened by the high concentration of military forces in Europe.

CSO: 5200/4015

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

BRIEFS

LIMITATION OF ARMS RACE--Prague April 6 TASS--Commenting on Soviet-American talks in Geneva, the newspaper RUDE PRAVO said today that world public attention in the past week was riveted to Soviet proposals to the American side there. They provide for introducing a moratorium for the period of the talks in Geneva on the production of space weapons and on research connected with the development and designing of such weapons as well as for freezing the strategic arms of both countries at their present, roughly equal levels and putting an end to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe with a simultaneous halting of its counter-measures by the Soviet side. "The Soviet initiative," the paper said, "is very valuable since, if it is accepted by the American side, it could improve the international situation and relations between the two countries and thus help achieve the objectives of the Geneva talks." "The Soviet proposals," RUDE PRAVO said, "are well-considered, sound and take into account the security interests of both sides. Undoubtedly, the American side's acceptance of the Soviet initiative would be a signal for real steps in the field of disarmament in future. The world is waiting impatiently for the response of the American side, which will show the degree to which Washington is prepared to match its words about a desire to agree to the limitation of the arms race by practical actions in this field." [Text] [LD061235 Moscow TASS in English 1046 GMT 6 Apr 85]

CSO: 5500/3031

SPACE ARMS

GENERAL STAFF CHIEF SUPPORTS 'STAR WARS' CONCEPT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Mar 85 p 28

Text The strategic defense program SDI ("Star Wars"), initiated by the North American president, was defended by Gen Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on his return yesterday to Lisbon, following a visit to Belgium. The space-based antimissile defense program, which has caused scepticism on the part of European members of NATO, and even open opposition, translates-- according to Lemos Ferreira in statements of NP Portuguese News--"the concern about advanced technology, and may allow us to find solutions that are more in keeping with the times."

"The SDI also means emerging or new technologies which allow us to maintain the status quo, the possibility of disarmament, and the adoption of a firm, logical, and coherent stance by NATO and its allies with regard to Russia and its partners in the Warsaw Pact"--emphasized the chief of staff.

Weighing the "extraordinary growth in recent years of the military potential of Russia and the Warsaw Pact nations," Lemos Ferreira called attention to the danger of the two alliances playing an extended game of chess where the desired result is that one player concede due to the foreseen victory of the adversary.

Alluding to the apprehension existing in several sectors of NATO over the enormous costs of "Star Wars"--more than \$26 billion over the next 5 years--Lemos Ferreira argued that what is achieved in high technology allows for advancements in other areas, and is intrinsic to progress, a point which he illustrated with the advances achieved in electronics based upon North American space efforts in the 1950's.

The differences among allies of the United States with regard to "Star Wars" have more to do with "Who is going to do what, and who gets to participate," says Lemos Ferreira.

The chief of staff revealed, on his arrival from Brussels, the possibility that Portugal and Belgium may exchange defense industry technologies within their NATO relationship.

Gen Lemos Ferreira admitted, "We are no worse off than before."

Lemos Ferreira's schedule in Belgium included a 2-day visit to SHAPE, NATO's European headquarters, in Mons, at the invitation of Gen Bernard Rogers, commander of the allied forces in Europe.

SPACE ARMS

RIFT IN NORWAY'S RULING COALITION OVER SDI

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Apr 85 p 9

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] "If the parliamentary leader of the Christian People's Party is not satisfied with the cooperation in the government coalition, I hope that in the future he will bring problems up in the proper forums. And solve them there. Not in the newspapers." Conservative Party chairman Erling Norvik said this to AFTENPOSTEN after Harald Synnes had warned of trouble in the coalition over space weapons.

It is hard to interpret the following statement from Harald Synnes as anything but a warning that there could be trouble:

"The disagreement in the government coalition over Norway's position on the production of space weapons will confront the government with far more complicated problems than it had in the disputes over soccer pool funds, the pornography law and opening hour regulations."

Synnes told STAVANGER AFTENBLAD that the Conservatives are not exactly in line with KRF [Christian People's Party] and SP [Center Party] when it comes to Norway's stand on the production of space weapons. But he did not think this would lead to a government crisis.

The KRF parliamentary leader also rebuked Prime Minister Kare Willoch. He thought it was unnecessary for Willoch to ask for a vote of confidence on the soccer pool issue.

"The request for a vote of confidence on the part of the prime minister could give the impression of unnecessary drama. No one in Storting thought the Labor Party would get a majority to support the proposal suggested by the Labor Party which Hanna Kvanmo of SV [Socialist-Left Party] took up."

Erling Norvik pointed out to AFTENPOSTEN that no matter how well the parties pull together in a three-party coalition, there are always some problems.

"The parties have not always started out with similar views on a number of issues. And in the course of a Storting period there will always be

situations in which everyone must be willing to make concessions in order to arrive at an overall solution. By and large Kare Willoch's coalition government and its parliamentary base have done very well. That is also the reason why it has achieved results that an increasing number of voters have expressed satisfaction with in the opinion polls."

Points for the Opposition

Norvik said it is management ability, efficiency and results that have created the confidence that is needed for the government to be voted in for 4 more years in the fall election.

But now one of the coalition's parliamentary leaders has issued a warning of what might be called internal star wars.

"I hope this 'warning of trouble' that the KRF parliamentary leader has now found it opportune to issue will not lead to any weakening in cooperative efforts on the part of his party's Storting group.

"Such a change would only benefit the opposition," said the Conservative chairman who continued:

"If the parliamentary leader of KRF is dissatisfied with the cooperation among the government parties in Storting--or with the cooperation between the government and its Storting group--I hope, as I said, that in the future Synnes will take the problems up in the proper forums. And solve them there. Not in the newspapers."

6578
CSO: 5200/2560

SPACE ARMS

HELSINGIN SANOMAT: FINLAND SHARPENS OPPOSITION TO SDI

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Finland Adopts Tougher Stand on Star Wars"]

[Text] One of the central principles of Finland's neutral policy line is to avoid one-sided stands on controversial questions between the super powers. One such question at this time is the strategic defense initiative being energetically marketed by the United States or the building of a space defense system, which the Soviet Union radically opposes.

Even in Finland the plans of the United States have been seen as a new alarming and dangerous development. Our foreign policy leadership has so far been satisfied with rather cautious statements of concern regarding the fact that the arms race between the super powers is threatening to expand into space. In light of recent statements by Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen and President Mauno Koivisto Finland's position is becoming tougher even though the tongue must be kept in the center of one's mouth.

Vayrynen, who delivered a speech at the national defense seminar, noted that "we have the right to present our own views on an issue which can not only decisively change the mutual security arrangements of the super powers, but also overall international security". The permanence of the whole present doctrinal structure of mutual guaranteed destruction and a new unprecedented spiral of an arms buildup together with all the factors endangering international stability are in the balance. Therefore, Finland is concerned about views which indisputably open up the extension of the arms buildup into space.

In a meeting with the editors of centrist newspapers President Koivisto stated that he has attempted to familiarize himself with the fundamental questions of star wars without gaining a reasonable concept of what it really means. An arms system to be built in space would be terribly expensive, its development would take a lot of time and the results would be uncertain. "One needs to ask whether it is a matter that can be taken seriously, be it in the West or in the East," deliberated Koivisto.

Such an assessment of President Ronald Reagan's central foreign policy initiative may startle career diplomats. Indeed, it is not a question of an official Finnish stand as Foreign Minister Vayrynen's statement may be interpreted at this stage. Koivisto has, however, declared in simple terms what is thought about the star wars plan in Finland in a proper forum and in a proper manner.

SPACE ARMS

FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON USE OF OUTER SPACE

OW280820 Beijing XINHUA in English 0739 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Helsinki, 27 Mar (XINHUA)--Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen expressed Finland's concern about a possible failure to reach an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control in outer space.

Speaking at a defense training course, Vayrynen said that outer space should not become a new sphere for arms race but should be used for peaceful purposes.

He said that contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union have been caused by long-term distrust of each other and can be resolved only when mutual trust is reestablished.

He expressed the hope that international politics will turn to a new period of detente. During this period, he said, though the big powers will still play a key role in international affairs, the neutral countries can also have an opportunity to take the initiative. Finland will help promote this change in world politics.

Vayrynen reiterated Finland's stand for a nuclear-free zone in north Europe. This is a main objective in Finland's foreign policy and it is based on Finland's own interest and security, he said.

CSO: 5200/4015

SPACE ARMS

FRG PREPARED TO ASSIST STAR WARS RESEARCH

OW300944 Beijing XINHUA in English 0721 GMT 30 Mar 85

[Text] Washington, 29 Mar (XINHUA)--Federal German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner said today that his government is prepared to undertake research for the U.S. star wars program as long as it has a fair say in deciding political and strategic issues in developing the system.

Speaking at the opening session of an American-German conference held in Dallas, Texas, the defense minister said that the U.S. star wars program might be an efficient way to protect both Europe and the United States.

"We need no (nuclear) superiority, but we cannot be inferior," said the minister, adding that "we have to remain strong enough to deny military success of the Soviet Union."

Woerner said Federal Germany "whole-heartedly" supported the U.S. stand in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in which the two sides were apparently ad odds on all major issues.

In defending his star wars policy in the face of European fears that the program is intended to protect only U.S. targets from attack, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said at the National Space Club here today that "our security is inextricably linked with other free people."

He assured U.S. Western allies that "an essential element of SDI (strategic defense initiative) research is the eventual ability to defend the United States and our allies from both long and short ballistic missiles."

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has formally invited 17 U.S. allies including Japan, Israel and Australia to take part in the star wars program, with the dealine expiring in May.

Britain today urged its partners in the European Economic Community (EEC) to lower the tempo in the debate over EEC participation in U.S. research for the star wars plan.

Speaking after the first day of a two-day summit of EEC heads of state and government in Brussels, British Government spokesman Bernard Ingham said that Britain was interested in taking part in the U.S. research effort.

CSO: 5200/4015

SPACE ARMS

XINHUA CITES LABOUR PARTY MP'S SDI OPPOSITION

OW040306 Beijing XINHUA in English 0221 GMT 4 Apr 85

[Text] London, 3 Apr (XINHUA)--The Labor Party today condemned the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as "a dangerous and fruitless endeavor which would lead to a phenomenal waste of resources and would cause irreparable damage to alliance solidarity and to superpower relations."

In a speech to members of the North Hull Labor Constituency released by the party today, Kevin McNamara, MP and deputy labor spokesman on defense, said that U.S. President Ronald Reagan, by his own pronouncements on the subject of star wars, had done more than any member of the peace movement to bring the whole strategy of nuclear deterrence into question.

President Reagan, having put NATO at risk over cruise and Pershing deployment, is now attempting to corral the NATO members with a 60-day ultimatum to accept star wars, he said, adding that "anyone who believes that this project is not necessarily destined to proceed beyond research is deluding himself."

Apart from doubts about the effectiveness of SDI itself, McNamara pointed out that such a system could not protect Europe from attack by aircraft, cruise missiles or short range ballistic missiles

"Little, if any, thought has so far been given to how such a star wars shield could be protected once in space, from anti-satellite weapons," he added.

In the economic aspect, 26 billion U.S. dollars has so far been agreed to just for a feasibility study into space defense. And it is estimated that the cost of putting such a system into operation would be about 1,000 billion dollars.

McNamara said that the money would be better spent on conventional defenses so that the West could rely less on nuclear weapons and rid itself of them through negotiations. This was labor's strategy and the only strategy that could reduce the risk of nuclear war, he said.

SDI represented the dangerous horizontal escalation of the arms race and would make the chance of nuclear war more likely, he concluded.

Earlier, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute on 15 March, expressed political, military, economic and technological doubts on the star wars system.

SPACE ARMS

LIAOWANG ASSESSES REAGAN'S 'STAR WARS' PLAN

HK010623 Beijing LIAOWANG in Chinese No 11, 18 Mar 85 pp 36-37

[Article datelined Washington by contributing reporter Wu Shijia:
"A Random Talk on Reagan's 'Star Wars' Plan"]

[Text] "Star Wars." This mysterious expression makes people think of the science fiction written by the famous British writer Wells depicting the invasion of "extraterrestrials." However, in the past 2 years this expression, which has become rather popular in the United States, embodies an entirely different meaning.

The "star wars" plan is another name for the "strategic defense initiative" proposed by U.S. President Reagan in 1983, which is a gigantic project involving many of the most advanced technologies. It is projected to be completed between 1985 and 1989. President Reagan has demanded appropriations in 1984 almost reaching \$1 billion. Thousands of American scientists have thrown themselves into the research, design, and manufacture of this project. According to officers of the Pentagon, this project will shrink to insignificance by way of comparison the "Manhattan" project of the United States to develop the first atom bomb in the world in the 1940's and the "Apollo" project for astronauts landing on the moon of the 1960's.

It has been learned that the objective of this project is "to protect the United States from attack by enemy missiles and warheads." Of course, whether this type of "defense" project can become an "offensive" one, or whether the project itself is a kind of "offensive" project as is energetically asserted by the Soviet Union, is another question pending the analyses and comments of experts.

The Characteristics of the "Star Wars" Plan

Compared with previous defense plans, the "star wars" plan has three characteristics.

--A long preparatory period. The "star wars" plan is one to use outer space as the commanding elevation to carry out "defense." Therefore, it is possible to detect the attacking missiles of the other side as soon as they are launched and to "strangle them in the cradle" before the attacking

missiles of the other side have hardly been launched. This is quite unlike previous defense plans which have aimed at destroying the attacking missiles of the other side only a few seconds before impact on their targets. Thus, more preparatory time can be gained.

--Multilevel defense. The "star wars" defense plan can be divided into three levels. The first level is interception in the "launching stage". Hundreds of satellites orbiting in different orbits in outer space keep the other side under meticulous surveillance. Sensors, the sensitive "eyes" of the satellites, can "see" the attacking missiles from the other side 2 or 5 minutes after they have been launched, and the miniature missiles carried by the satellites will immediately aim, be launched, and destroy the attacking missiles and warheads. The second level is interception "midway in outer space". If the first-level interception has been unsuccessful and some of the attacking missiles have already entered outer space and have launched many warheads, then it is necessary to effect second-level interception against them. Powerful laser weapons will project powerful laser beams into outer space. After the giant reflector of the satellites in outer space have refocused the laser beams, they then will be aimed to hit and destroy the missiles or warheads. The third level is "reentry stage" interception. If by chance any missiles or warheads of the other side have "slipped through the net", escaped first- and second-level interception, reentered the atmospheric layer of the earth and intruded into the vicinity of their targets, then it will be necessary to effect third-level interception by targetting the guiding antimissile missiles deployed on the ground to "hit head on" the attacking missiles or warheads, or laying a concentrated barrage to destroy them.

--New defensive weapons. The weapons to be used in the "star wars" plan are called "weapons of the future", and can be classified into three types. The first type is laser beams. The velocity of a laser beam is equal to the velocity of light--300,000 kilometers per second. It includes many kinds, such as chemical laser beams, free electron laser beams, nuclear missile polyenergetic laser beams, and so on. They rely on extremely high temperature or a "hammering" force to destroy the missiles or warheads of the other side. In addition to fast velocity, laser beam weapons also possess the characteristics of long range. Laser combat stations in outer space could project destructive light beams at the blink of an eye and hit a target as far as several thousand kilometers away. The second type is particle beam. This type of weapon is called the ultimate weapon in the "star wars" plan. They are a stream of subatomic particles (electrons, protons or neutrons) which are accelerated almost to the velocity of light. These high-speed particles can destroy the sensitive electronic systems of the other side and make the weapons of the other side inoperative and their operational systems "blind" and "deaf". The third type are dexterously projected objects, which are also called "dexterous stones". They will be launched by "electromagnetic slingshots" and guided by miniature computers. They can automatically look for targets and use kinetic energies to shatter the missiles or warheads of the other side. The velocity of this kind of weapon is slower than that of particle beams, but the percentage of hits would be higher.

Many American scientists hold that the true key to the success or failure of the "star wars" plan lies in computer technology. During the high-speed combat, various types of weapons and their auxiliary equipment all should methodically work according to predetermined plans, and this entails a sophisticated, accurate, and stringent computer program control. According to estimates by experts, the computer software programming for systems of the "star wars" plan will reach around 10 million lines, greatly exceeding any computer software produced to date.

New Developments in Weapons Manufacture

Recently, scientists of the U.S. Defense Department told news reporters that a "breakthrough-like" development has been made in laser beam weapons by American scientific research personnel. They said that the powerful laser beams produced by laser beam generators on the ground can be first projected on a variable reflector called a "rubber mirror". This remarkable reflector can enable the laser beams to effect adaptable "compensative" changes while being reflected from the reflector according to the movement of atmosphere at that time. When the laser beams have entered outer space through the densely disturbing atmospheric layer, they can be restored to their original, stable undulating pattern again, free from the influence of atmospheric interference, thus creating an important condition for the manufacture of laser beam weapons.

American scientists have also disclosed that they have already spent about 5 years in manufacturing third-generation nuclear weapons. The so-called third-generation nuclear weapon is a type of new weapon utilizing nuclear energy, following atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs. This weapon can converge the energies produced by the explosions of more than one nuclear bomb into fatal light rays, namely, the nuclear-X laser rays. The blast force of this weapon is several thousand times greater than that of chemical lasers, and moreover this kind of directional weapon can be easily transported into outer space for use. A scientist of the U.S. Energy Department said that in addition to the tests of nuclear-X laser rays conducted in nuclear weapons labs, the United States has also tested the third-generation nuclear weapons in underground sites in Nevada. The general orientation of the research is to transmit the energy produced by nuclear explosions to a great distance. Ten percent of the appropriations for the "star wars" plan will be spent in studying nuclear weapons.

One day in June 1984, with the sound of an explosion occurring in the sky over Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, a fast-flying simulated U.S. Minuteman missile was shattered to pieces by an experimental interceptor launched from Kwajalein Atoll. This interceptor projectile is a new weapon in the "star wars" plan--an ingenious projectile. American scientists said that the success of this test is an important breakthrough, because the technical requirements are "ten times more complicated than that of using a bullet to hit another bullet." This famous "huo ming ao fu li" [7202 2494 1159 1715 0448] experiment has evoked worldwide repercussions. Allegedly, to a certain degree, it has promoted the arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

A scientist of the U.S. Defense Department said that these ingenious projectiles will be launched into outer space by "electromagnetic slingshots" which are also called "orbital guns". The ingenious projectile is only as large as a loaf of bread and will be guided by a miniature sensor and propellor to focus in on and attack fast-flying missiles or warheads. The split second when it reaches the target, an umbrella-shaped mechanism inside the projectile will suddenly unfold, expand the contact angle, and, relying on the kinetic energy produced by high-speed flight, destroy the target.

How to distinguish genuine warheads from dummy ones is also a component part of the "star wars" plan. Keyworth, science adviser to President Reagan recently disclosed that American scientists are exploring such types of "insight" technology to differentiate the dummy from genuine warheads from among a series of advanced technologies, ranging from laser radar to infrared sensors with computer devices, and that important developments have already been made.

Disagreement By Their Critics

Although President Reagan has already put forward the "star wars" plan for 2 years and moreover the plan is being vigorously implemented, there are many people who hold different opinions in the United States. They have raised objections with respect to many fields such as politics, economics, military affairs, and so on; and some of them have questioned the feasibility of this plan.

Some people have stated that the "star wars" plan is doomed to failure, because as far as a country with a vast territory is concerned, actual protection is more difficult than "merely dealing with physical laws", in particular when combatting potential opponents with the same advanced technology. So long as the other side adopts some countermeasures, like strengthening the outer casings of offensive missiles and using various false appearances to carry out deception, defenses can be easily broken through. Some people say that at present the Soviet strategic arsenal has about 8,000 warheads, and that defense against them can be complicated merely by doubling or tripling this figure to win through sheer quantity. Some even state that if the other side manages to manufacture a quick-climbing missile, and if the nuclear warheads carried by this missile can complete launching before the "star wars" plan surveillance satellites have the time to spot and intercept them, then the first-level defense in the "launching stage" will collapse without being attacked. And the defenses of the other levels also have flaws open to attack; for instance, laser reflectors could be installed on missiles or warheads to offset laser ray attacks, and so on.

Recently, some apologists of the "star wars" plan have made some compromises to these objections. They claim that the initial objective is to establish "a protection network with holes" mainly to protect the land-based nuclear arsenal. This explanation of "protecting limited targets" has further provoked disagreement by the opponents, who hold that "such wording is

contradictory to the original intention of the plan put forward by President Reagan both in spirit and in reality."

In fact, in addition to the sophisticated science and technology, the "star wars" plan also involves many other fields, exceeding the scope of pure science and technology. The "Manhattan" project and the "Apollo" project cannot even be compared to it in terms of complexity. Therefore, the success or failure of the "star wars" plan "will only be disclosed in subsequent chapters."

CSO: 5200/4016

SPACE ARMS

U.S. GETS 'OBSCURE RESPONSE' FROM FRANCE ON SDI

OW302006 Beijing XINHUA in English 1910 GMT 30 Mar 85

["News analysis: France Uncommitted To U.S. Star Wars Program (by Wang Wei)" --XINHUA headline]

[Text] Paris, 30 Mar (XINHUA) --U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, ending a three-day visit here designed to persuade the French Government to join in the research for the U.S. "star wars" program, met obscure responses from his hosts.

Weinberger came here from a two-day nuclear planning meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Luxembourg, at which he invited the NATO European allies and some other Western nations to participate in the research for the program, formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). France was not represented at the meeting.

The NATO defense ministers expressed their support for the SDI. But France, the leading West European nation in space research, has not yet made it clear whether it would take part in the research.

Weinberger has met French President Francois Mitterrand, Defense Minister Charles Hernu and External Relations Minister Roland Dumas. But French official sources have only said that France would study the U.S. proposal "with great interest."

An Elysee spokesman also said that "the president had listened with interest to the American view on the SDI," clearly a diplomatic rhetoric.

An AFP report said that there is no indication that the French Government has been enticed by the U.S. proposal. Hernu told the newspaper LE MONDE that France needs further consultations with European partners on this issue.

Expressing his misgivings about the U.S. project's feasibility and value, Hernu told Weinberger in their talks that France did not want to give up its nuclear deterrent because it takes Soviet missiles shorter time to hit West European countries than the United States.

He was also reported to have expressed disapproval of the United States taking advantage of the discussion of the space defense system to divide the Western Europe.

France had taken exception to the star wars program as soon as the project was disclosed. France is afraid that it would upset the balance of forces based on nuclear deterrents.

France, as an independent nuclear power, advocates that Western Europe should maintain its own nuclear deterrent. So it argues that it is not necessary to spend large sums of money on SDI research.

To allay French doubts about the U.S. program, Weinberger assured West European allies that SDI would not weaken France's nuclear force. He even said that it was a good thing for France to have its own independent nuclear force.

Meanwhile, France seems a little worried over the prospect of being isolated from its allies once it stays away from the SDI research. French sources said that keeping the talks between Weinberger and French officials secret does not mean the U.S. proposal was not well received. They added that some misunderstanding had been removed after each side explained its position.

As things stand now, the French Government appears to take the U.S. proposal with an open mind. An AFP report said that the door remains open to fresh discussions on the issue.

CSO: 5200/4015

SPACE ARMS

U.S. BRIEFS FRG LEADERS ON STAR WARS PROGRAM

OW280938 Beijing XINHUA in English 0831 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Excerpts] Bonn, 27 Mar (XINHUA)--A U.S. delegation today explained the contents and importance of the "star wars" program to the government and Bundestag of Federal Germany.

His introduction deeply impressed German leaders, but aroused different responses from various parties. The ruling Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union Alliance was comparatively responsive, while the Free Democratic Party has had reservation and the opposition Social Democratic Party and the Green Party have expressed outright opposition.

The Federal German Government in a statement today stressed the need to halt the race in space weaponry and all forms of war. It said the U.S. research in this field is "justified," but government sources said Bonn regarded the question of participation as open and did not expect to make a decision until more explanation was made from the United States. Chancellor Helmut Kohl will discuss this issue with President Reagan when he visits Bonn in May.

A Bonn Government source said a decision would depend on certain conditions. These would include guarantees of an exchange of technologies and consultations on the eventual deployment of a space-based defense system.

Recently, Federal German leaders have made a series of statements indicating their worry about the star wars program. This is mainly because they think it might weaken the defense alliance between West European countries and the United States.

CSO: 5200/4015

SPACE ARMS

EUROPEANS 'APPREHENSIVE' ABOUT SDI PROGRAM

OW203210 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 1150 GMT 29 Mar 85

["International Current Events" commentary by XINHUA reporter: "Western Europe's Anxiety"]

[Text] A few days ago, the United States formally invited its allies to participate in its strategic defense program for developing space weapons and asked them to declare their stand within 60 days. The United States also sent its first delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany to explain the contents of and need for this program.

Two years ago, when President Reagan first proposed his strategic defense plan, Western Europe could still afford to make criticism and jokingly called it the "Star Wars" program. But today Western Europe is faced with a decision of profound impact. Should they approve or reject it? Should they be a participant in or just a bystander of this program?

In the interests of the U.S.-Western European joint defense, the member nations of NATO must demonstrate unity at a time when the U.S.-Soviet Geneva talks have just begun. Obviously, it is not in the interests of the West's overall defense to immediately reject the "Star Wars" program. When viewing the matter from the angle of military technology, if Western Europe rejects any participation in the strategic defense program, in time it might find itself being left far behind by the United States in advanced military technology.

It is precisely because of these considerations that British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher and FRG Chancellor Khol have conditionally taken a positive view of the program. At a meeting between the French and FRG heads of state, both held that it is better for the West European countries to participate in the program's research work.

But in view of the U.S. strategic defense program's possible impact on Western Europe security, the Western European nations are truly apprehensive. Once the West has shifted from its current strategy of nuclear threat to one of space defense, Western Europe will find itself being deprived of the means to counterbalance the Soviet Union's advantage in conventional weapons, thus increasing the possibility of fighting a regional war in Europe.

Geoffrey Howe, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has openly expressed doubt about the "Star Wars" program. The FRG's president, Chancellor, and Minister of Foreign Affairs have also expressed their worry that the United States plan might adversely affect the uniformity of strategic thinking among the Western allies, thus bringing with it instability. They hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will make progress in their Geneva talks, thereby rendering the program unnecessary. All this shows that anxiety is mounting in Western Europe.

Naturally, the Soviet Union could not turn a blind eye to all this, but instead can take advantage of it. Ever since the meeting between the Soviet and United States Foreign Ministers last January and the decision to reopen the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union has spared no efforts to persuade Western Europe to look after its own welfare and ask the United States to abandon its "Star Wars" program. When FRG Foreign Minister Genscher was visiting Moscow early March, Gromyko told him that if the FRG participates in the U.S. program, it will be in fact destroying the anti-ballistic treaty, and consequently harming the entire nuclear arms reduction efforts.

Now, it seems that the history of 3 years ago is repeating itself. The current European situation is similar to the one 3 years ago when medium-range guided missiles were being disputed. The United States insisted on deploying them, while Western Europe was full of misgivings and the Soviet Union did its best to influence the outcome. Although the subject has changed today, Western Europe has again found itself in the same awkward predicament. How could this not cause deep worries among the Europeans?

CSO: 5200/4016

SALT/START ISSUES

PITFALLS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM EUROPEAN VIEW

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Winter 84/85 pp 245-255

[Article by Francois Puaux, deputy permanent representative of France in the NATO Council (1958-1959); director for Europe (1964-1968), then director, of political affairs in the Quai d'Orsay (1972-1975); French ambassador to Italy until 1981; during which assignments he participated in drawing up, then implementing, the French position on all politico-strategic problems [as given in biographical footnote]: "A Dangerous Game: Arms Control"]

[Text] Historically, there have been cases of unilateral disarmament, the most famous being that of the United States at the end of the 1950's until the brutal awakening of the Korean War. But despite interminable conferences, there have /never [in italics]/ been any contractual disarmament agreements other than those the victors have been able to impose.

One need not be a great prophet to foresee, at the start of Ronald Reagan's second term, that neither will there /ever [in italics]/ be a genuine mutual control of arms. At best, one can expect certain accords, more for "window dressing" than useful. Indeed, there is no obvious reason why the grand deception of the last 20 years (it was in 1964 that Johnson spoke of SALT for the first time) should suddenly undergo a transformation tomorrow into a promising exercise. Obvious, on the other hand, are the reasons opposing the success of an undertaking for which so many politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are so insistently clamoring.

The Limits of Arms Control

I. First of all, arms control does not cover--and cannot cover--in its entirety the domain it seeks to regulate. The negotiators of the SALT agreements had to limit their discussions to a few types of weapons, arbitrarily defined as "strategic," that is, capable of striking the territory of the other superpower. The insufficiency of detail and the necessarily limited scope of the SALT agreements had two consequences:

- a) The Russians switched their effort, successfully, to getting round the agreed ceilings by qualitative improvements to their missiles. They multiplied the number of warheads carried by their rockets, a technique (MIRV-ing) in which the Americans thought they had a 10-year lead.

b) They exploited unsparingly the field not covered by the SALT agreements, namely, that of the FNI's, or, medium-range (1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) nuclear weapons. They set out to achieve an overwhelming regional superiority in Europe (unflatteringly defined at the time as the "gray zone") by deploying their SS-20's--the "terror weapon"--against it.

The same danger stalks us today. The "zero option," the validity of which Washington reaffirmed during Andrei Gromyko's visit to Ronald Reagan on 28 September, calls for the withdrawal of all Euromissiles: The American Pershing 2's on one side, and the SS-4's, SS-5's and the famous SS-20's on the other. One fact that was simply forgotten was the one that Admiral Falls, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, had nevertheless pointed out on 21 June 1983: In the figurative "zero option" case, the Russians would retain in Europe their SS-22's, which are classed according to range (900 kilometers) just below the FNI's, but which can, with remarkable accuracy (of the order of tens of meters), threaten at one and the same time the FRG, France, England and the Benelux nations. London's International Institute of Strategic Studies reported at the beginning of October that the USSR had already secretly deployed 90 of these missiles on ultra-mobile automotive launchers inside the GDR and in Czechoslovakia. In the face of these revelations, can "option zero"--a formula that would maximize the decoupling between the United States and Europe, and the disputed authorship of which is curiously claimed by Helmut Schmidt, Ronald Reagan, Francois Mitterrand and even Valery Giscard d'Estaing--continue being unconscionably proposed? Negotiations concealing traps of this magnitude can hardly be expected to lead to "good agreements."

II. By a purely mechanical effect, arms control leads, in some cases, towards reflexes of a "Parkinsonian" type and to a quantitative rise in armaments. The delegations obviously make it a point of honor to obtain the highest possible ceilings, and they succeed not without making mutual concessions. According to General Gallois, "Had they been adhered to, the general lines of the negotiations concluded at Vladivostok in 1974 by Messrs Brezhnev and Ford would only have accelerated the nuclear warheads race: Had they deemed it advantageous to do so, the Americans could have deployed 20,000 of them in 1990, and the Soviets more than 25,000... while adhering to the letter of the so-called "limitation agreements."⁽¹⁾ It will be noted that the respective figures are: For the United States 9,792 strategic warheads and for the USSR 8,671, bombers included.

Added to this is the sometimes feverish desire that can seize American presidents to conclude a treaty. Witnesses have described the "frenetic final hours" of the 1972 horse trading in Moscow between a Brezhnev who was not yet ill and a Nixon 6 months away from his reelection.⁽²⁾ And the Europeans cannot forget Jimmy Carter's desperate eagerness in June 1979 to conclude SALT 2, an agreement that finessed the hand of the Old Continent. Obsessed by their essential objective, the limiting of Soviet MIRV-ed ICBM's, the Americans agreed to a substantial reduction, for the next 2 years, of the range of land-based cruise missiles, rendering them inadequate for the defense of Europe, for which they had nevertheless been designed. There were, at that time, 90 SS-20's already in place on the Soviet side!

III. The prospect of a resumption of negotiations is producing another mechanical effect: Each side intends to use to the maximum the currently agreed ceilings, which are already higher than needed, as bargaining chips. Clearly, this is the case of the MX, the ICBM that is to replace the "Minute-man." The building of this huge missile, weighing more than 300 tons and equipped with 10 warheads, has been debated for so long (since 1973) that it is now outdated, for it is highly vulnerable. To be preferred over it, and in the offing, is the single-warhead-equipped "Midgetman," which is mobile and cheaper. The Congress has nevertheless agreed to the building of 36 MX's (the Administration wants 100 of them), on the promise that they will be negotiated.⁽³⁾ The Pershings are threatened by the same fate, as we shall see later herein. As for the Soviets, they are acting no differently: They are piling up SS-20's in Europe, as bargaining chips.

IV. Still a fourth problem with arms control needs to be pointed out, relative to the general conduct of East-West relations. In effect, negotiations in the arms domain risk skewing the course of U.S.-USSR relations, by occupying too much of the American Administration's attention. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger remarked recently, favorable though he is to the SALT agreements: "Arms control can stabilize sectors where war is not very probable, but it cannot do much to produce stability in sectors where it does not already exist." And lastly, we submit that the SALT agreements gave the Americans a false sense of security during the 1960's, which engendered a relaxation of their defense effort and which was not alien to the wave of pacifism that ravaged both sides of the Atlantic. The Kabul coup towards the end of December 1979 produced a rude but salutary awakening. Reagan's election was in large part owing to it.

Reagan and Arms Control

Ronald Reagan cannot be regarded as an arms control expert. Far from it. He has not taken great delight, as Kissinger did in his time, in juggling "carrying capacities," "launch weights" and "propellable weights." But he knows that what is involved is a dangerous and deceptive, perhaps inescapable, undertaking which can only be entered into from a position of strength. Long before his election, he had taken, on this point, the opposite course to Jimmy Carter, who believed firmly in the SALT agreements and had spoken this memorable sentence: "We have fought fire with fire, without ever thinking that to fight against fire the best thing is water."⁽⁴⁾ But Reagan is capable and prudent. Within his team, he listens with equal interest to both the partisans and the adversaries of arms control. He maneuvers not without dexterity between the pressure from the Churches and the partisans of a "nuclear freeze" on the one hand, and that of Senator Jesse Helms and the ultra-conservatives on the other.

The President is also very attentive to the "voice of the people." The polls give a very accurate picture of the feelings that motivate his fellow-citizens, even though they reflect a certain ambivalence with respect to this problem. By an overwhelming majority of 78 percent to 7 percent, Americans are convinced that the Soviets are not interested in any agreement that does

not give them the advantage. Almost as large a majority (75 percent versus 21 percent) doubts that the Soviets adhere to the commitments stemming from these accords. Despite this, 8 Americans in 10 (85 percent versus 15 percent) feel it is important for their country to try to establish better relations with the USSR. They accept the idea of a nuclear freeze but reject that of a unilateral reduction. In essence, they want approximate parity. (5)

Reagan's policy responds to and aptly reflects this deep-seated America. The President knows that not much good can be expected to come from arms control; but he has also understood that this issue has the force of a myth and that a frontal assault on it would be inadvisable. After taking the necessary time to get Congress to pass an impressive rearment program, he opened with the Russians, on 30 November 1981 in Geneva, a conference on Euromissiles, in accordance with NATO's "double decision" of December 1979. The talks labeled START--which name (in which the term "reduction" replaced the term "limitation") aptly translates his maneuver, recalling that of Krushchev in the 1960's--began shortly thereafter, in Geneva, on 29 June 1982. The object was to make maximalist proposals that would hardly be acceptable but that would produce the effect sought on public opinion, taking the initiative away from the Russians, and leaving up to them to them the responsibility for ending the two Geneva conferences, concurrently with the arrival of the first Pershings in the FRG in November 1983. [This strategy] thus won the battle of the Euromissiles, to the great relief of the Europeans, who regained their feeling of security and became less receptive to pacifism and neutralism. It also gained time.

The presence of the Pershings, which the Soviets consider "strategic," since they can strike Soviet territory, changed the climate of givens of a possible arms control; less, however, than did Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" speech of 23 March 1983. After talking of it initially as "science fiction," the commentators gradually came round to realizing that it was a credible initiative. All observers agreed on one thing: The President believed in his idea. He had believed in it for a long time. Already as far back as when he was governor of California, he had been haunted by the "despair" inherent in the strategy known as MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction]. To the surprise of his generals and admirals, he adopted straightaway the idea of an effective ABM [antiballistic missile] system, mentioned in his presence during a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1983.

Moscow must deal with this determination on his part.

An Uncommon Complication

SALT 1 and Salt 2 agreements (putting aside the protocol on cruise missiles) addressed only strategic missiles. SALT 3, had it taken place, would undoubtedly have addressed also Euromissiles and possibly FBS's [Forward-Based Systems] (meaning bombers stationed in Europe). The bursting in of space defense on the scene has completely upset the prospects for negotiations as viewed at the start of Ronald Reagan's second term. A pause is therefore in order in this regard before examining the problem of strategic missiles and FNI's.

To understand the emotion felt by the Russians towards the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], it must be recalled that the problem of ABM weapons represented the major difficulty of the SALT 1 negotiations. The exorbitant cost of the contemplated systems finally damped the ardor of the negotiators and brought about the treaty of 26 May 1972, which limited each side to two antimissile defense sites (reduced to one site each in 1974). The Americans decided to forgo this capability. The Soviets built a defense network around Moscow against nuclear-warhead missiles (the Galosh network), a rather rudimentary one, and stopped there. The possible necessity of a total defense of their territory, and the astronomical expenditures it would entail, suddenly place before the USSR a problem of the utmost seriousness.

The other aspect of Ronald Reagan's SDI concerns satellites, the indispensable outposts of all strategic defenses. It is not surprising that both sides would seek to destroy these embarrassing "watchtowers" before the start of any open conflict. Since 1971, the USSR has been testing a "killer" satellite that explodes in the proximity of the enemy satellite.⁽⁶⁾ The U.S. Air Force, for its part, is experimenting with a much more sophisticated anti-satellite weapon, the ASAT, which can be fired from an F-15 fighter plane and should be operational by 1987.

Immediately following Ronald Reagan's 23 March 1983 speech, the Russians reacted vigorously to his plan. In August, they instituted a unilateral moratorium on the orbiting of any further antisatellite weapons. They demanded that the United States do the same and submitted a project to the UN on the nonmilitarization of space. Moscow was echoed to some extent by the Europeans, who feared finding themselves "squeezed" some day between two impenetrable space-based defenses. Mrs Thatcher expressed reservations publicly on this point in July. Mr Manfred Worner, the FRG's defense minister, did likewise. France, for its part, went further: It proposed to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on 12 June 1984, the "very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, especially those that would be capable of bringing down satellites in high orbit, the preservation of which is of the utmost importance from the standpoint of the strategic balance." This proposal was not unfavorably received. Many, on the other hand, felt that Paris was annoyingly playing "into the hands of the Soviets" in proposing a prohibition of 5 years duration on all testing and deployment, on the ground, in the air and in space, of directed-energy weapons. The fact is that, had it been accepted, it would have blocked the American plan in its entirety.⁽⁷⁾

A vast disarray and indeed some anguish are visible on the part of Moscow, which risks seeing vanish in space the famous "strategic parity" so dearly achieved during the 1960's and recognized by the SALT agreements.⁽⁸⁾ The USSR has made the space issue the linchpin of its propaganda and diplomacy. This probably explains Mr Gromyko's 28 September visit to the American President who not very long before had been calling the Russians "liars," "cheaters," and (citizens of) "the evil empire." The USSR cannot but find it hard to resume dialogue, but neither can it avoid it. Whatever the state of Mr Chernenko's health or his successor's, Moscow is sure to pull out all the stops to delay the American space plan.

For Washington, on the other hand, to accept in advance of any discussion a prior moratorium would have been a defeat--virtually a capitulation--that would have compromised the SDI from the start. A certain margin for negotiation is nevertheless perceptible. Thus, a temporary moratorium could be agreed to for certain aspects of the plan if the Russians agree to a comprehensive overall discussion. Also, the idea of prohibiting weapons that can knock out high-altitude satellites (in geostationary orbit at an altitude of over 36,000 meters) is of equal interest to both the superpowers. And there is talk of a possible prohibition, binding on both parties, against developing more than one system each for low-altitude interception.

It must be added that the total protection by directed-energy weapons referred to in the 23 March speech is a very distant long-term objective, and that what is involved insofar as concerns the foreseeable future is an ABM defense of missile sites and not of populations. What is being referred to is the interception of ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (that is, during their reentry) by kinetic-energy weapons--a goal the American engineers are now in a position to achieve, as was demonstrated by the spectacular result of the test on the atoll of Kwajalein in June. If only 50 percent of the enemy warheads could be stopped in this way, deterrence would already be considerably enhanced. Europe would gain from it to the extent that the Soviet SS-20's could be knocked out by this system. At least, this is what the Americans explain to their more than hesitant European allies. As for France, it could retain for a long time yet its anti-cities strategy. MAD still has many long years ahead of it.

The Russians should not entertain too many illusions as to the effects of their campaign. Ronald Reagan is dead set on SDI; he believes in it. He has, he stated to the American Legion on 4 September, "a moral obligation to pursue this technological breakthrough." Washington will not make the marginal concessions referred to above unless Moscow agrees to enlarge the talks to encompass all weapons, and in particular the ICBM's such as the SS-18 and SS-19 (first-strike weapons that are especially menacing and destabilizing, and that have become the principal concern of the Americans since being equipped with multiple warheads). The Russians, whose strong-point these weapons are, will not be flexible, preoccupied as they are with "equal security." This is a demand which Washington has rejected as being incompatible with the SALT agreements, but which, from the Soviet viewpoint, is not unfounded. The fact is that the USSR could indeed some day have to face not only the United States but also, simultaneously, China, France and England. She wants therefore to possess as many weapons as all her potential enemies combined.

Is a horse trade possible as between space weapons and ICBM's? It is doubtful in view of the vital importance attached to these weapon systems by both sides.⁽⁹⁾ Secretary of State George Shultz would be quite willing to entertain such a horse trade. But Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger is vehemently opposed to it. In his view, space weapons "are not a bargaining chip." The President will have to arbitrate, but it is clear that he will lean towards Weinberger's viewpoint.

The situation is different from the standpoint of the FNI's, which the two parties will be talking about at the same time during the talks that are to follow the Shultz-Gromyko meeting of 7-8 January in Geneva. In principle--Mr Gorbachev reiterated it during his 20 December visit to London--everything must be able to be invoked under the famous "umbrella" proposed by Ronald Reagan to save face for the Soviets. Various working groups are to be formed to deal with controversial issues within the framework of a single "forum," Moscow having "priorly" renounced its demand that the Pershings be withdrawn. As regards Euromissiles, the reciprocal abundance of "hardware" (572 Pershings and cruise missiles; 405, and tomorrow possibly 600, SS-20's, without counting the SS-22's) is such that reductions are contemplatable and have in fact been planned. (The figure at one time had got down to 120 SS-20's on the Russian side).

But to date, Moscow has refused to accept the deployment of any Pershings at all. In this, there is a potential danger for Europe.

Though not reflecting the Administration's position, some American circles would willingly trade off a renunciation of the Pershings in exchange for a reduction in Soviet ICBM's.(10) Nor should it be forgotten that the compromise proposed by Paul Nitze, the negotiator at Geneva, and labeled the "walk in the woods," purely and simply abolished the Pershings, retaining only 75 cruise missiles on the American side versus an equal number of SS-20's. The Pershing, however, is the weapon systems-link par excellence between the defense of Europe and that of the United States.

The other major obstacle in the path of FNI negotiations is the Soviet demand that account be taken of the French and British nuclear forces in the Euro-missiles balance. Paris and London are absolutely opposed to this. Their missiles belong to national deterrent forces embarked on submarines and cannot be compared (except for the 18 rockets on the Albion Plateau) with other than the 950 Soviet submarine-launched warheads.

On this point, the United States has always been very firm. It does not want to concede to the Soviets the advantage of the overbalancing of its theater nuclear forces in Europe by the Soviets, that would result from counting as part of the Allied arsenal 162 French and British missiles that are not under the U.S. command. What will happen in 1994, when France will have 496 warheads aboard its oceanic force, and England 512? It will hardly be possible to ignore this problem. Indeed, this is what Vice President Bush was hinting at in a statement on 28 September 1983 which caused somewhat of a stir. President Mitterrand has not precluded the idea of a conference including the five nuclear powers. However, he has placed difficultly realizable conditions on the reduction of the currently existent gap between the nuclear and conventional forces of the superpowers and those of the others. In any case, he stated in a speech delivered before the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1983 that "It would be paradoxical for a country to depend on a conference in which it had not taken part."

Added to these mammoth difficulties is a problem which, with the advances being made in the ever more rapid miniaturization of weapons, becomes ever more difficult to resolve: That of monitoring and verification.

Let us put aside the different methods being advocated here and there for reducing armaments, like the "build-down" proposed by certain members of the Congress, with the President in agreement, which would consist of destroying two old warheads for each new one. This is a far more complicated method than its seeming simplicity would lead one to believe. Perhaps the soundest method would be that of "indirect arms control," wherein each country would unilaterally take steps that could be echoed positively by the other.

The "historic" artisans of the SALT agreements have lost their enthusiasm for, and do not appear to expect much to come from, a process which for the initiated has lost its magic. And this can only help Ronald Reagan. NEWSWEEK⁽¹¹⁾ attributes to Zbigniew Brzezinski the disenchanted statement that: "The time has come to stop believing that arms control is the secret key to friendly relations with the Soviet Union and even to the enhancement of mutual security." In the view of Jimmy Carter's former adviser, the latter must come about through a long, ambiguous process that demands unilateral actions on both sides. Henry Kissinger is saying the same thing when he writes: "There is no such thing as technological solutions to a political negotiation."

Therein lies the problem in its entirety. There is no substitute for trust, a trust that has never held sway, even at the height of detente. The SALT 2 agreements, said Ronald Reagan in 1979, are "fatally flawed." But if trust existed, would there still be the effort to "regulate" armaments? The circle is inherently a vicious one, and there is every reason to believe it will remain so for a long time to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pierre Gallois, POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 1979, No. 1, p 51. These alarming figures are explained by the fact that, at Vladivostok, a limitation was placed on the number of multi-warhead missiles, but not on the number of warheads a missile may carry.
2. As regards the conditions under which political leaders are compelled to negotiate arms problems with the Russians, one can best cite Kissinger: "The process of arms control is dominated by experts who have studied these problems for years whose number far exceeds the number of hours the political leaders have devoted to them. The latter are compelled to extricate themselves from a mire of technical gobbledegook on which their diplomacy depends, but which they are not equipped to evaluate." INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 30 July 1984.
3. In May 1983, the White House divulged the text of a letter addressed by the President to Representative Norman Dicks, in which Mr Reagan indicated that "The overall level of deployment (of the MX) will depend on the

Soviet strategic programs and on arms reduction agreements. Similarly, Mr Kenneth Adelman, head of the Arms Control Agency, admitted for the first time, on 22 June 1983, that the United States could forgo the MX on condition that the Soviets do away with a certain number of heavy missiles (essentially SS-18's). Noteworthy in this instance is the role played by Congress, which complicated the negotiation by imposing specific conditions on the appropriations it voted.

4. Jimmy Carter's response to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who pressed the United States to restore the balance in Europe that was destroyed by the Soviet SS-20's. Reported by Andre Fontaine in LE MONDE, 27 October 1983.
5. "A Talk with Louis Harris," THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Chicago, August-September 1982. These figures were confirmed by other polls analyzed by "Public Agenda Foundation," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, autumn 1984.
6. The USSR is believed also to have developed two ground-based test lasers, designed to "blind" enemy military satellites. These lasers are to be operational by the end of this decade. THIRD ANNUAL PENTAGON REPORT ON SOVIET DEFENSE.
7. Also seen therein was a contradiction with the plan introduced at The Hague in February by the President of the Republic, for a European military space station.
8. As to the Reagan Administration's quest for strategic superiority, see Robert W. Tucker, "The Nuclear Debate" in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, autumn 1984. The 1982 defense directive states: "The American nuclear forces must prevail and be able to compel the Soviet Union to seek the quickest end to hostilities under conditions favorable to the United States." The existence of a "prevailing strategy" was read into this. But Tucker points out that the "countervailing strategy" of Jimmy Carter's 1959 directive was not basically different. I would be tempted to say that it is the general tenor of the Reagan discourse on defense that gives the impression of seeking to exceed strategic parity, and certain statements, like Mr Weinberger's (NBC, 8 September), according to which, if the 1972 ABM treaty interferes with the American arms program, it must be abandoned. It is recalled that this treaty, which is part of SALT 1, can be denounced on 6-months advance notice.
9. The Soviets have proposed, under START talks, lowering the ceiling on land-based MIRV-ed ICBM's from 820 to 680. But this concession would still permit them to retain in service all their SS-18's and SS-19's, precisely those on which the Americans have set their aim.
10. See interview with Adm Stansfield Turner, former head of the CIA, in ETUDES POLEMOLGIQUES, No. 31, 3rd quarter 1984.
11. 1 October 1984.

9399
CSO: 5200/2544

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S.-USSR MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE TALKS BEGIN

OW290933 Beijing XINHUA in English 0825 GMT 29 Mar 85

[Excerpts] Geneva, 28 Mar (XINHUA)--U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators on medium-range nuclear missiles held a working session at the Soviet mission to the United Nations today.

The session on the subject was the first of its kind since the two superpowers resumed their Geneva talks on 12 March and also the first in 15 months since the Soviets walked out of the medium-range nuclear missile talks on 23 November, 1983.

A news blackout was maintained on the substance of today's negotiations. But various statements have indicated the two superpowers were far apart in the separate talks of space weapons and strategic nuclear weapons as well as medium-range nuclear missiles.

On the medium-range missiles, the United States has called for balanced cuts in the weapons pending their total elimination by both sides.

But the Soviet Union has refused to reduce its arsenal of SS-20 missiles unless U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles are removed from Western Europe.

Meanwhile, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev criticised the United States for stationing additional cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Western Europe, charging Washington with using the Geneva talks as "a screen" for continued military programs.

The talks on medium-range missiles today concluded the first week of detailed negotiating group discussions at the arms control talks.

CSO: 5200/4015

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BELGIUM DISAPPOINTED WITH GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

OW090932 Beijing XINHUA in English 0845 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Text] Brussels, April 8 (XINHUA) -- Belgium is disappointed at the Soviet proposal to suspend deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans said on television tonight.

He noted that NATO will not accept the proposal made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev based on the present ratio of missile deployment.

The Soviet Union has installed 412 missiles with 1236 nuclear warheads in Europe but NATO has only deployed 136 missiles. Therefore, Tindemans said, it would be unfair to conclude an arms control treaty on the present level.

Tindemans said that the Soviet Union has made a couple of proposals to suspend missile deployment in Europe and the latest proposal by Gorbachev contained nothing new.

The Belgian foreign minister also expressed surprise that the Soviet proposal was not made at the Geneva negotiations but during a PRAVDA interview with Gorbachev.

CSO: 5200/4023

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ANCIAUX SUGGESTS POSTPONING MISSILES, REFORMING NATO

Brussels LE SOIR in French 2/3 Mar 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Vic Anciaux, President of Volksunie [Flemish People's Party]:
"No Unity in NATO"]

[Text] Never, until recently, has belgian foreign policy been the focal point of public interest, both national and international, that it is now. And not because of the policies being followed but rather because of the total lack of a coherent policy.

It should be noted on this subject that public protests were heard mainly in Flanders, both in Parliament and on the streets.

Like Belgian diplomacy, the government looked foolish because of the Washington visit of Martin and Tindemans. The settling of scores seen in the aftermath, both among politicians in the present coalition and among those in the former majority, suggests that our government was held responsible because it gave too much latitude to our negotiating diplomats.

Within our diplomatic ranks there probably is a secret group that has made promises that no one was informed of afterwards and whose importance and scope were only revealed years later.

The fact that the Belgian government has lost face, both abroad and inside the country, is the consequence of the monopolization of a certain number of key positions by political functionaries who have succeeded in imposing their personal interpretation of Atlantic solidarity. They were successful because of the total lack of vision and direction by those government officials in charge.

Moreover, in tempore non suspecto, we have protested against this type of nomination. Now it turns out that we were entirely correct in doing so.

The entire debate on the question has become a humiliating "yes-no" question completely unrelated to anything else, in which an attempt is being made to equate the deployment of missiles with fidelity to NATO and vice versa.

In fact, it is a matter of a technical decision of a military nature. And adherence to the Atlantic alliance should not be implicated to cancel it unilaterally, as the Scandinavian countries did. The missiles are a political weapon rather than a military one. The principle of the defense or security cannot, therefore, be a valid argument on the subject.

The entire problem that arises currently on the political question is whether we want a monolithic and bureaucratic military alliance or, on the contrary, a real alliance where American power and Europe act on equal footing.

If the second option which, incidentally we agree with, is selected, Belgium must take its national responsibilities, and especially because of the general chaos now existing, take the initiative for a reorientation of NATO in conformity with European interests, which do not always coincide with those of the United States. The allies remain independent nations. It is not fitting that their own politics should be subjected to an anonymous collective decision of a bureaucratic nature. The alliance is a forum where, by the exchange of ideas and information, each partner can set his own policy, while at the same time taking the problems and objectives of others into account.

Each member nation must give its utmost for the purpose of improving relations with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern block nations. It is obvious that these hopes for a detente can in no case lead to a break within the alliance.

The military intoxication that is now stirring up East and West against each other has also been extended to the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], thus threatening the mutual agreement among the allies. Because legitimate economic interests go unrecognized in the name of a formal fiction based on a so-called "gentleman's agreement" whose practical results turn out to be as divisive as they are ineffective.

In reality, bringing the glacial winds of the cold war into commercial and economic relations constitutes in reality a militarization of new technologies. We all know that the markets of the future will be more related to the development of advanced technologies which will always "lend themselves" to being used for military ends.

In the current state of affairs, Belgium should return to Harmel's policy. This policy succeeded in modifying Flemish criticism of the obscurity of our diplomatic policy and in turning the alliance in a European direction. A policy of European peace could consist of a resolute attempt to improve bilateral relations. Such a policy would have the advantage of being not only coherent and trustworthy but, above all, effective.

All of that presupposes a reformist, but constructive, attitude towards the alliance. Our attachment to NATO cannot be confused with an obvious submission to all of the decisions by military circles. Moreover, the idea that the alliance cannot be reduced to purely military interests is as alive in the United states as it is in Europe.

However, identifying devotion to the Atlantic alliance with acceptance of the deployment of missiles constitutes a typical case of dangerous simplification and brainwashing and is imposed on us by a bureaucratic machine that has long since lost all contact with the people.

A reformist and constructive attitude towards NATO should be adopted. The non-deployment of the missiles would constitute a first step in the right direction. Moreover, Martens should not close the door that the Soviet leaders have just cracked open during their talks with Ignace Lindemans of Pax Christi.

We must not miss the opportunity to slow down the ever increasing spiral of nuclear armament in both the East and the West. The allies, and particularly the Americans, must respect European feelings on the subject.

Such a policy would respond to the desire for peace in Flanders. But it will only become a reality with professionalizing the top ranks of our diplomatic corps. Linguistic balance is required, but in no way constitutes a guarantee. It is the quality of the administration at the top and its implications that are important.

Raising the consciousness of the Flemish population opens the way. The translation of these aspirations to a finally acceptable policy is a mission for all the Flemish political parties. Flemish nationalists have been aware of this for a long time.

9969
CSO: 5200/2516

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

USSR CRITICIZES U.S. POSITION AT STOCKHOLM

OW291930 Beijing XINHUA in English 1918 GMT 29 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow, 29 Mar (XINHUA)--The Stockholm disarmament conference proceeded slowly and has yet to switch from speech-making to real negotiations, Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation at the conference, told reporters here today.

Grinevskiy, who has just returned here from Stockholm, complained that the unconstructive position assumed by the United States and some other NATO countries impeded earnest discussions of measures to increase mutual trust on political and military issues.

Grinevskiy claimed that NATO's proposals at the conference contained nothing new but an attempt to check the military activities of the Warsaw Pact Alliance and gain the upper hand.

Considering the U.S. stand, he said, it is hard to tell when the actual negotiations will start.

CSO: 5200/4015

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

INDIAN STAND ON NUCLEAR ARMS STATED AT GENEVA

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 13 Mar 85 p 7

[Text]

London, March 12 (PTI) — As the two super powers opened their talks in Geneva today on curbing nuclear arms race, India demanded a total elimination of nuclear weapons and deplored moves to introduce such weapons in the outer space.

Minister of State for External Affairs Khurshid Alam Khan told the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva that the nuclear weapon states must foreswear the use of these weapons. The grave implications of deploying nuclear weapons in the outer space were also stressed by him.

Expressing the hope that the super-power negotiations would, in due course, produce agreements on nuclear disarmament, Mr Khan underlined the major points contained in the declaration issued by the six-nation summit on the subject, held in New Delhi in January. The declaration has been circulated as a conference document at the meeting.

The importance attached to the super-power negotiations cannot be over-emphasised in view of the fact that nuclear weapon states have a particular responsibility for the present nuclear advancement of the world, Mr Khan said.

"We have conveyed to the two negotiating teams our concern with the issues they will be grappling with, our expectation from their talks and our best wishes for their successful outcome", the Minister told the meeting before reminding it that in the Delhi declaration great importance had been attached to the proclaimed objective of these negotiations.

He said that India attached utmost importance to an early commencement of serious negotiations on a treaty on a comprehensive test ban, on prevention of nuclear war, on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of arms race in the outer space.

Mr Khan said that the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty should be to prohibit nuclear weapons tests in all environments, by all states and for all times, during the period when negotiations on the treaty are underway, all nuclear weapon states should suspend the testing of nuclear weapons so as to create a favourable international climate for the success of the negotiations.

While welcoming the super power negotiations, he expressed the view that the question of nuclear disarmament was far too important to be left to the super powers alone.

CSO: 5250/0005

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

CPCZ DAILY CLAIMS WEST ANGLING FOR WEAPONS INCREASE

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Mar 85 p 7

[Text] On Thursday, the leader of the Dutch delegation, Jan Hein van de Mortel, spoke at the Vienna negotiations on reducing the level of armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

It could be seen from his speech that the West is only taking tactical steps in Vienna in order to be able to increase the military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is likewise putting off an answer to the proposal for an agreement on initial reductions in the level of ground forces and arms of the USSR and the United States in central Europe and a freeze on the level of armed forces and arms in that area which the socialist countries submitted 3 weeks ago.

The proposal calls for reduction in the number of ground forces of the USSR and the United States in central Europe by 20,000 and 13,000 men, respectively, within 1 year, starting as soon as the appropriate agreement goes into effect. In the future, the maximum level of armed forces in central Europe would be 900,000 men on each side, of which 700,000 would be ground forces troops.

6285
CSO: 5200/3005

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

CSSR WEEKLY COMMENTS ON VIENNA DISCUSSIONS

Prague TVORBA in Czech 27 Feb 85 p 6

[Text] In the Redoubt Hall of the Hofburg Palace in the capital of Austria, representatives of the 7 Warsaw Pact states and the 12 NATO countries continue negotiations on reducing the level of arms and armed forces in Central Europe. Some political observers expect that if there are positive developments in the U.S.-Soviet discussions in Geneva, they could contribute to progress in the negotiations in Vienna as well, which have been going on for 11 years.

Right from their beginnings in 1973, the socialist countries have sought to conclude an agreement which would reduce the danger of military confrontation in Central Europe and by treaty ensure an approximate balance of forces in this area and the security of all participating countries. The enormous importance which achieving this goal would have for reducing tensions in the international situation in Europe is obvious to anyone who is aware of the threat to peace resulting from the great number of troops and arms in central Europe. If it should come to the point where imperialism attempts to achieve its aggressive goals in Europe by armed conflict, it is obvious that it would not be just a local conflict, as the American strategists proclaim in their doctrine, but a war which would inevitably involve other parts of the world as well. The Vienna negotiations therefore also have exceptional worldwide significance.

A Possible Basis for Agreement

To date, however, there have not been any significant results achieved which would provide a justified basis for hopes that the negotiations will result in the signing of a mutually advantageous agreement in the near future. At the same time, constructive proposals by the socialist countries have more than once in the past provided a starting point for such an agreement, which often went more than halfway in meeting the demands of the Western delegations.

We can, for example, point out the proposals by the Warsaw Pact countries of 18 February 1982, which suggest that a reduction in the overall level of armed forces in central Europe be achieved in two stages. In the first stage, the number of ground forces and arms of the Soviet Union would thereby lower the number of its troops in central Europe by 20,000 men and the United States by 13,000 men. After completion of the second stage of reductions, the collective level of armed forces of each side would not exceed 900,000 men

(700,000 in the ground forces and 200,000 in the air force).

The proposed agreement also contains measures which should ensure verification of its fulfillment, including the establishment of temporary control posts, the use of national technical means of control, and carrying out consultations. Associated actions are also an integral part of the proposal and, among other things, call for the creation of a joint control commission, prohibition of military exercises in the area of reduced armed forces which would involve the participation of more than 40,000 soldiers, etc.

What was the West's answer? Its first reaction would have seemed to indicate that it was taking a more realistic position on proposals by the socialist countries. Indeed, for example, the proposals by the Warsaw Pact countries accepted the original demand of the West for two-stage reductions and a number of other subjects. But not long ago, the Western delegations submitted a counterproposal which proved to be totally unacceptable for the socialist states. It again pushed for acceptance of the so-called asymmetrical model of reductions, which is a totally obvious attempt to change the historically determined balance of power in Europe. The Western counterproposal also totally omitted the especially important question of reducing the number of weapons and combat equipment.

The West also ignored in its document the necessity of limiting the number of air force members. It particularly demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw substantially more troops from the area of reductions than the United States and, moreover, organic combat ready units, while the United States could pull out individual members of the armed forces, among others. The NATO countries justified this demand of theirs by the unsubstantiated statement that the Warsaw Pact states supposedly have a superiority of about 150,000 men over NATO in the ground forces in the area of planned reductions. At the same time, the West rejected the data on the troop strengths of the socialist countries submitted by us and, as a basis for calculations, their experts took into consideration only their own subjective estimates. But not a single one of their evaluations of the numbers could be seriously justified so far by them.

This was the situation when the Soviet Union submitted new proposals on 17 February 1983 in the name of the socialist states which were to exclude from further negotiations any pointless discussions of the numbers of armed forces by committing each military-political coalition to reducing their armed forces in central Europe in the course of 3 years to the already agreed-upon collective level of 900,000 men. At the same time, effective control measures would go into effect. The Soviet Union, moreover, after agreement with its allies offered, in addition to the earlier unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet soldiers from the CDR, to remove another 20,000 members of the ground forces from central Europe over the course of 1 year if the United States would likewise withdraw 13,000 of its own soliders from the same area. All other participants in the negotiations should freeze the level of their own armed forces for a limited time period.

This proposal by the socialist countries became the basis for a proposal for an overall agreement on mutual reductions in the armed forces and arms in central Europe and the actions connected with them which the socialist countries submitted for discussions in Vienna on 23 June 1983. The proposed agreement clarifies several points of the previous document and in a special section it includes an extensive set of concrete measures, including a system for checking on reductions in the level of not only foreign troops, but also the forces of the countries lying within the area of the planned limitation of armed forces.

Even though these proposals went a long way toward meeting the position of the Western delegations, the socialist countries in 1984 again came up with a new proposal on the so-called question of exactly determining the numbers of the armed forces of the participating countries.

In mid-February of this year, the USSR in the name of the direct participants in the negotiations (that is, the CSSR, the GDR, and Poland as well) submitted a proposal for Basic Provisions for an Agreement on Initial Reductions in Ground Forces and Arms of the USSR and the United States in Central Europe and a consequent commitment not to increase the levels of armed forces and arms of the countries in that region. It is based on the 1983 proposals, further clarifies them, and also moves toward meeting some other demands by the West. For example, it puts emphasis on reductions in the two superpowers' troops and armament and permits 10 percent of the reduction quotas of both states to be made up of individual soldiers.

Since the Vienna negotiations began, the military-political situation in Europe has been changed significantly as a result of the increasing aggressiveness of imperialism, especially American imperialism, which is understandably reflected in the atmosphere of the talks and particularly in the goals which the West is pursuing in Vienna.

What Exactly Are the West's Intentions?

Let us look in more detail at, for example, what is really hidden behind their attitude of rejection on the question of reducing the numbers of weapons and combat equipment. The Pentagon strategists not long ago came up with a new offensive concept, which is also very strongly supported by the supreme commander of the Allied Armed Forces in Western Europe, American General B. Rogers. It is the so-called concept of limited conventional war. More precisely, it is a matter of preparation for aggression against the socialist countries through the use of qualitatively new weapons systems, whose design is based on the latest scientific discoveries in the fields of microelectronics, optical electronics, laser technology, etc. To conduct such extensive conventional warfare, the Pentagon also requires thousands of modern tanks, cannon, and other weapons and, of course, well-trained soldiers. The American and British secretaries of defense therefore have already put large quantities of heavy weapons and combat equipment in storage in the Benelux countries and the FRG for use by divisions which in case of need are to be transferred by air over a period of a few hours or days from the British Isles and the United States to central Europe.

It is understandable that the withdrawal of American soldiers with the appropriate arms from Europe to the United States and the inclusion of the combat equipment in storage in the established ceilings for arms, or even its withdrawal back to the United States, would seriously disrupt the implementation of the intensified war preparations of NATO. But this is just why the Vienna negotiations were started in the first place. Indeed, Soviet units with their arms have been pulled out and thus the risk of war in Europe was significantly reduced overall.

A closer look at the military activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also makes it quite obvious why the Western delegations are keeping quiet to avoid the idea of limiting troop operations in the area where their numbers are to be reduced.

Since 1975, the FRG has been the site of the most important and largest annual maneuvers, the regular autumn series of NATO exercises called Autumn Forge, in which hundreds of thousands of soldiers take part. For example, there were 110,000 members of the British, West German, Dutch, and American armies who participated in last year's British Army Lion Heart maneuvers, while 55,000 soldiers took part in the Swift Hedgehog exercises of the West German Second Army Corps which took place at the same time as the exercise of the British units.

There was a total of 26 such extensive maneuvers last year which took place in close proximity to the borders of the socialist countries. In contrast, the extent and number of large exercises by the Warsaw Pact countries' armies is significantly lower.

If the West would enter into a treaty limiting troop operations, it would not only mean a substantial step forward toward military detente, but would also have a positive effect on the overall political atmosphere in Europe.

6285
CSO: 5200/3005

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.

COMMENT ON MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION TALKS IN VIENNA

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 85 p 6

[Article by Dimitrije Seserinac: "The Forgotten Negotiations"]

[Text] The value of the almost forgotten negotiations in Vienna on mutual balanced reduction of forces lies perhaps precisely in their permanence, or, if we might so put it, their persistence. They have gone on now for almost 12 years already, and the meetings are held once a week. These are now the longest negotiations on disarmament which have ever been conducted in history. However, even after the several hundred meetings that have been held so far in the magnificent rooms of the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, no results have been achieved. The delegations and delegates in their ceremonial dress and dignified manners have had their fill of greeting one another and shaking hands out of full respect for the rules of protocol, have had their fill of dinners and of talking at cocktail parties, but in Europe on both sides of the line of demarcation of the military blocs there are still nearly 2 million soldiers in the first strategic echelons of the land forces and about 11.2 million men in all on active service in all forms of armed force.

If the reserve forces are included, Europe is pressed on both sides by a total of about 23.8 million soldiers with the most modern equipment and armament, or about 332 divisions, 86 of them armored divisions. This is the situation according to the most recent data of the London Institute for Strategic Research, mindful of the plans that exist for wartime deployment of land forces by all the countries of both blocs.

Maneuvers and Obstacles

So, after 11.5 years and more than 500 meetings, the number of soldiers presented at the negotiations in Vienna has hardly changed by a hair. Following several moves by the Warsaw Pact to withdraw some 20,000 soldiers and about 1,000 tanks, which was interpreted by NATO as a maneuver which actually involved withdrawing unnecessary units and outdated arms--nothing actually happened.

The main obstacles to all progress in negotiations which have been opposed by the Western military alliance--that every situation must be verified on the spot, that the Warsaw Pact has a relative advantage because an ocean divides

the principal NATO forces from the potential war theater, and the third (which would actually seem funny if it were not so sad)--the method of counting units and men has not been agreed on at all--have not been removed.

Three weeks ago the representatives of the Warsaw Pact presented a new proposal whereby the Warsaw Pact countries would withdraw 20,000 Soviet soldiers and NATO would withdraw 13,000 American soldiers.

Although one senses an atmosphere of relaxation in this move by Moscow, and Western circles themselves have said so, mentioning at the same time the decision of the Soviet Union to allow the authorities of a civilian international commission for nuclear energy with headquarters in Vienna to carry out an on-the-spot inspection of Soviet nuclear power plants, the representatives of NATO have not accepted this proposal without posing their own special demands. That is, they are now demanding that inspection of those changes be conducted on the spot and during the actual withdrawal of the units, not after the withdrawal has been completed. Second, NATO demands that immediately following these first measures to reduce forces in Europe a general reduction of American and Soviet forces, that is, the forces of the leading powers of the blocs, be undertaken. The reason for this is the intention to prevent the USSR from gaining a propaganda advantage from these minor withdrawals, which in terms of troop strength do not mean much.

The West's assertion that withdrawing 13,000 or 20,000 soldiers does not mean much is accurate. However, posing conditions which will knowingly prevent this modest beginning does not seem much more sensible, if there is a desire, as is asserted, to remove the threat of war in Europe once and for all. After all, as the old Chinese saying goes, even a march of 1,000 miles begins with the first step. Moscow's proposal is very specific and, as even the West admits, it is easy to carry out. It actually incorporates an old NATO proposal to begin reduction of forces in Europe by withdrawing the forces of the leading powers of the blocs and to take up production of the forces of the other members of the blocs afterward.

The proposal also provides that these initial reductions be codified in an agreement, which was what the West earlier requested.

Shouting to No Point

No one supposes that even these small, or indeed even larger reductions and withdrawal of forces could essentially alter the balance of power between the opposing superpowers. On the contrary, it is clear that any disarmament or indeed even reduction of forces depends on the state of those relations which today are such that they could hardly be worse. But no one can deny that even a small reduction of forces and armament could operate toward improvement of relations. The negotiations in Vienna, such as they are, have actually served as a clear indicator of the state of those relations. They have not improved them, but they might be the initiator of a change of that state and could contribute to the creation of confidence.

Today there does not exist any goal of war which could be realistic and feasible in a war between the blocs on European soil. Both conventional and nuclear forces, or actually the integrated complex of modern weapons, precludes the possibility of achieving any political goal which might be achieved by war, that is, with weapons. Today this is more than clear, and the voices which acknowledge this are becoming clearer and clearer on both sides. Any gain would be less than the loss which the war would inflict on both sides.

So, the shouting about the threat from the East and the shouting about the threat from the West has no point whatsoever, just as there is no sense in this long-lasting and immense armament to the point of self-exhaustion on both sides.

The same lack of logic is also evident in the thesis that nuclear armament is necessary because of the weakness of the forces. It is logical to achieve a reduction of conventional forces through negotiations when the other side also has the same nuclear weapons so that the nuclear arsenals are practically excluded, since they lead to mutual destruction. In any case today there is a consensus that the greatest threat to the world is commencement of a war with conventional forces that would escalate into a nuclear war. So the logical first demand is to reduce conventional forces.

The talks in Vienna therefore have great importance. A demonstration of goodwill in small things can and should bring about a state of relations that could act toward reduction of confrontation and creation of a climate for achieving success in other areas of disarmament or arms control which are now being dealt with in Geneva.

7045
CSO: 5200/3009

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

ANNIVERSARY OF BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONVENTION NOTED

PM281344 Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 26 Mar 85 p 3

[Vladimir Solovyev "Commentator's Opinion": "The Road to Disarmament"]

[Text] March 26 marks the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the "convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction." This major document, which has been ratified by almost 100 states, was essentially the first real disarmament measure in the history of international relations. Whereas other international treaties or agreements were aimed at limiting specific types of weapons and their proliferation and at creating obstacles to their use, this convention envisages for the first time the complete elimination of one of the most dangerous types of mass destruction weapons--bacteriological weapons.

The adoption of the convention was possible thanks to the tireless struggle waged by the CPSU and the Soviet state to curb the arms race, prohibit the most barbaric types of weapons, and ensure complete disarmament. Back at the end of the twenties the Soviet Union came out with a draft convention which envisaged ending in the shortest possible time the production of all means and appliances for chemical attack and bacteriological warfare and ensuring their destruction, including dismantling enterprises producing these means.

It is not our fault that it took almost half a century before this document corresponding to the interests of all humanity was ready for signing in April 1975. For many years its conclusion was hindered by those imperialist forces which gambled and continue to gamble on whipping up the arms race and fueling tension in relations between states. Even after the signing of the document they did not stop trying to circumvent the agreement and undermine it, using to that end slanderous accusations against the USSR and its allies.

As for our country, its position is clear and consistent. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee noted, "We will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence." Our state's intention to travel right to the end of the road leading to disarmament has been repeatedly confirmed by history. The dozens of

of Soviet peace initiatives, including the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, and the USSR's readiness to reach concrete accords at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva are a vivid example of that.

CSO: 5200/1074

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

U.S. ACCUSED OF TRYING TO 'TORPEDO' CBW BAN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by O. Georgiyev under the rubric "The Facts Reveal": "Ominous Experiments"]

[Text] Recently, an official spokesman of the U.S. Defense Department, D. Smith, reported that the Pentagon had decided to conduct a large series of tests this spring involving poisonous gases possessing a nerve-paralyzing effect. The experiments are planned to take place at the U.S. Army's Aberdeen and Dougway chemical warfare proving grounds, as well as at the Pine Bluff Arsenal. Their aim is to determine the effectiveness of operational 155-mm missiles armed with the poisonous war gases VX and Sarin.

It is significant that the Pentagon timed this announcement for the opening of the disarmament talks in Geneva, one of the prime issues on the agenda of which is the establishment of an agreement prohibiting chemical weapons. Thus, the U.S. administration is attempting right at the start to torpedo the very possibility of a favorable solution to this problem. This, moreover, is no accident. In fact, the Pentagon is going ahead with its rearmament of the armed forces with new types of chemical weapons -- binary ammunition. As Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger stated in his most recent directive, as early as the current year the armed forces of the United States "must be prepared for the rapid use of chemical weapons," and by 1990 the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy will be required to have "completed the development of new delivery systems for binary chemical weapons."

These ominous orders are being put into practice. Because of the binary ammunition, it is planned to augment stocks of poisonous gas held by U.S. forces in western Europe by an additional 19,000 tons in the near future. In fact, it is the Pentagon's opinion that chemical weapons will mainly have to be used here, on the European continent, against the states of the Warsaw Pact. And the supreme commander of combined NATO forces in Europe, the American General Rogers, has a reason for urgently demanding the right to personally make the decision without any consultations to employ chemical weapons in future military operations.

The development of widespread testing of poisonous warfare gases indicates

that, despite Washington's peaceable rhetoric, Pentagon officials are not halting their efforts to improve already existing chemical weapons and to create new types. And past experience teaches that the fanatics in the U.S. Army do not wish to restrict themselves to mere tests on the proving grounds.

Barbaric experiments have been conducted more than once on the territory of other states. For example, during the course of the "dirty war" in Indochina, the Americans tested a number of chemical formulas for poisonous gases. More than 2 million peaceful inhabitants became the victims of American chemical attacks.

Today, also, the Pentagon's specialists are attempting to test chemical weapons on the territory of other states. Poisonous gas is being supplied to gangs of Afghan counter-revolutionaries with the aid of the CIA.

The tragic events which occurred at the chemical plant of the American company Union Carbide in the Indian city of Bhopal revealed yet another unsavory aspect of American experiments. Investigations showed that under conditions of strict secrecy research was being carried out at this plant, which was supposed to be concerned with the production of peaceful products, on the development of new chemical substances to harm plants, animals, and humans.

These activities took place in a well-equipped scientific research laboratory whose cost of construction substantially exceeded expenditures for the construction of the plant itself. Physicians were of the opinion that the victims of the accident were affected not only by those substances manufactured at that plant, "but also by some more powerful poisonous gases." This is why American specialists failed to inform Indian authorities after the accident about the methods and remedies required for treating the poisoning, and why NATO experts in the field of chemical weapons were sent disguised as doctors, so that they would be able to observe and describe with professional precision the entire pattern (kartina) of people's deaths.

The facts irrefutably indicate that in preparing newer and newer types of poisonous warfare gas, the experiments from the Pentagon are entirely unconcerned about the safety of thousands and thousands of human beings.

12412
CSO: 1807/232

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

U. S., SOVIET ATTITUDES ON CBW BAN CONTRASTED

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 9, 3 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Vladimir Kuznetsov]

[Text] Experts of the chemical weapons special committee at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament work behind closed doors.

Outside the Palais des Nations, where the committee holds its sessions, things are debated openly. Being discussed in the press at the moment are new facts on continued work in the USA on production of chemical weapons.

In a recent example, a US Defense Department spokesman announced plans for holding this spring new tests of nerve agents at Aberdeen and Dugway US Army testing grounds and near the town of Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The objective is to assess the effectiveness of the 155-mm missiles currently in service charged with the VX-type agent and sarin.

The USA possesses the world's largest chemical weapons potential with more than 90 varieties of weapons totalling nearly 300,000 tons. Some 90 state-run and private companies in the USA are engaged in the development and production of chemical weapons. Among them is one of the giant American transnationals, Union Carbide, which for many years has been one of the Pentagon's main contractors.

At present there are 55,000 tons of highly toxic agents stockpiled in American depots. In 1983, while American delegates were debating in Geneva the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling

of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, the United States went ahead with a wide-scale "chemical rearmament" of all the armed services starting a radical modernization of the chemical arsenal. The five-year programme will cost 10 billion dollars, providing for an increase in chemical ammunitions of up to 5 million items.

The programme stresses so-called binary ammunition charged with nerve gas. The US administration seeks in its 1986 fiscal year a projected federal budget of 151 billion dollars for its development, a 30 per

cent rise from the previous budget. According to Secretary of Defense Weinberger's directive, the US Armed Forces should be ready this year for the swift use of chemical weapons, while the US Air Force and Navy should complete the development of new systems of delivery of binary ammunition by 1990.

Does this signify a repetition of chemical savagery? Old scars are still plentiful. In Vietnam, for example, the US Air Force sprayed nearly 50 million litres of dioxine, destroying more than 500,000 hectares of forests, 360,000 hectares of cropland. And 2.5 million Vietnamese civilians fell victim to these crimes.

The Soviet Union advocates a full and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. In January, 1984, the Warsaw Treaty countries made an offer to NATO countries to pledge to liberate Europe from chemical weapons. Such regional measures, if implemented, would speed up the signing of the convention on banning chemical weapons.

CSO: 1812/189

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

GROMYKO URGES SPAIN TO RETAIN NUCLEAR-FREE STATUS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 85 p 13

[Article by Felix Bayon]

[Excerpt] The USSR is confident that Spain can contribute "in constructive fashion to the task of slowing the armaments race," Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko stated yesterday in Madrid in the course of a toast he offered at the conclusion of the banquet given in his honor by his Spanish counterpart, Fernando Moran, in Viana Palace. Gromyko also expressed satisfaction with the fact that Spain has decided not to allow nuclear weapons on its territory. Gromyko and his wife Lydia were entertained by the Spanish royal couple yesterday at the Zarzuela Palace, and after lunching at Viana Palace, the Soviet and Spanish foreign ministers continued the talks begun the preceding day for another 50 minutes before joining the technical delegations from the two countries for a meeting.

In his speech, Gromyko stressed the dangers which extending the armaments race to space would create, and he mentioned ailing Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko three times. "The interviews and negotiations we have had here in Madrid," he said, "are focusing on the problems which concern absolutely all peoples and states. Among them are prevention of the militarization of space, slowing the nuclear armaments race and avoiding the threat of a new war."

"However, there are individuals who issue challenges to the world public," he said later on, referring to but not mentioning U.S. President Ronald Reagan by name, and "they seem obsessed with drafting projects for the militarization of space," "pretending to pass it off for little more than a guarantee of weapons reduction." "Even the medieval scholars would have envied such logic," he said in conclusion.

Gromyko stressed the role which Spain can play in this problem, in his view. "Each state, large or small," he said, "has its own potential for contributing to the success of negotiations, or failing to do so." "In the Soviet Union," he added, "we have high regard, because of its just value, for the decision of the Spanish government to maintain Spain's status as a nation free of nuclear weapons. Does it not then suit the interests of Spain if the level of nuclear confrontation is not raised in Europe, and if there are no efforts

to challenge the existing, and above all, territorial, reality, and if the pan-European process based on the principles and provisions of the Final Helsinki Act is strengthened?"

The King and Democracy

The man who has headed the Soviet diplomatic service for almost 3 decades said later on that "the USSR and Spain can seek common views where the need to eliminate the centers of international tension by political means is concerned. But it is also certain," he added, referring directly to the United States again, "that events are occurring in the international arena wherein some want to impose their will on sovereign states and peoples, sparing no means, even using the force of arms."

In conclusion, and referring to Central America, he said that "it is necessary to put an end to the state terrorism practiced in international relations."

During the toast he offered, Fernando Moran made mention three times of the speech delivered by the king of Spain in Moscow last May, at the beginning of his tour of the Soviet Union, focusing on the passages in which the king praised the democratic system.

"We are absolutely convinced," Moran added, "that it is possible to achieve a balance at a lower armaments level, without thereby placing the legitimate security interests of each state in danger." The Spanish minister of foreign affairs said that "for obvious geographic, historic and cultural reasons, Spain is a part of the West and defends its values and way of life." "Now then," he added, "on the basis of this reality, it is our duty and our desire to seek and to maintain a certain margin of autonomy, which is nothing other than the defense of our national interests, a defense which does not seek to alter the balance of power, but which does not want to be subject to subordination of any kind either."

Apart from the exchange of impressions about the international situation which took place in Madrid between Gonzalez and Moran, on the one hand, and Gromyko on the other, the visit paid by the veteran Soviet diplomat to the Spanish capital seems to have had limited bilateral results. On Thursday, the delegations of both countries postponed the planned meeting when the talks between Moran continued beyond the time period originally scheduled. Yesterday the delegations met for only an hour and a half.

It was after 8:00 p.m. when Gromyko bid his Spanish counterpart, Fernando Moran, goodnight, in English, at the foot of the steps of the Santa Cruz Palace. "See you tomorrow," Gromyko said.

5157
CSO: 5200/2542

NUCLEAR TESTING

RATIFICATION OF NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY DEPOSITED

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 13 Mar 85 p 8

[Text] Moscow, Mar 12:--Bangladesh has reiterated her call for a general and complete disarmament and other measures to safeguard and strengthen the fragile structure of world peace reports BSS

Bangladesh ambassador to the USSR, Syed Najmuddin Hashim deposited Bangladesh's accession to a treaty and a convention of disarmament here yesterday and in his brief speech on the occasion, said that his country attached great importance to general and complete disarmament.

The treaty signed in Moscow in 1963 by the USA the USSR and the UK bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in the outer space and under water. The convention on the prohibition of the development production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction was signed in Moscow, Washington and London by the USSR the USA and the UK in 1972.

Ambassador Hashim said that those who were capable of waging a war must primarily shoulder the responsibility for keeping the peace.

The peace loving people of Bangladesh he said needed a milieu of peace to be able to develop their human and material resources to ensure for themselves a decent standard of living. they therefore, look to the Soviet Union and other signatories to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and biological warfare convention for subsequent tangible and effective measures for the promotion of world peace, he added.

Ambassador Hashim in his speech also referred to President Ershad's address to the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in June 1982 where the Bangladesh President had expressed growing concern at the continuing escalation of arms race which threatened the very existence of human race.

The President had also proposed that since outer space was a common heritage of mankind it should be used for humanity at large.

President Ershad had also pressed for a decision to convene the Colombo conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in conformity with General Assembly resolutions.

Receiving the instruments of accession on behalf of the USSR Government, Mr Y E Fokin Secretary General of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that depositing of Bangladesh's documents in Moscow, which played important role in negotiating the treaty and the convention was a fact of certain positive, significance for Soviet Bangladesh relations.

Bangladesh's instrument of accession were signed by Foreign Affairs Adviser Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury.

CSO: 5250/0006

END